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BEING FRANK ABOUT THE FOURTH: ON
ALLEN'S "PROCESS OF
'FACTUALIZATION' IN THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE CASES"
Wayne R. LaFave*
Step aside, and I'll show thee a precedent. ... Francis! . . . Thou art
perfect. . . . Francis!
- 1 King Henry IV, act ii, scene 4

I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

Forthrightly About Frank

An invitation to participate in a special issue for such an inestimable personage as Francis Allen is itself a distinct honor - so much so,
in fact, that refusal seems out of the question no matter what risks
may attend this undertaking. The principal risk, as I see it, is that if
one's contribution were to be assessed by a reader who, by virtue of
this collection of essays, was also reflecting upon the writings of Allen,
one is bound to come out the loser in any comparison. But I assume
this risk, as substantial as it doubtless is in my case, so that I may join
in the celebration of the remarkable accomplishments of an outstanding law teacher and legal scholar over a career that has so far spanned
almost forty years.
It is my particular good fortune to have known Frank Allen all of
my professional life. Indeed, we first met while I was still a law student at the University of Wisconsin, courtesy of my mentor there,
Frank Remington. Had I known then that I would someday be called
upon for this performance, I most certainly would have chronicled the
exact date of this initial encounter with one of the giants of the law
teaching profession. But all that I can recall as I now peer back
through the mists of antiquity is that this was an occasion (one of
many) on which I did not distinguish myself. 1 A lesser man than Al"' David C. Baum Professor of Law and Professor in the Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois. - Ed.
1. My recollection, such as it is, is that I had accompanied Remington to the University of
Chicago Law School to hear a talk on some aspect of criminal justice which was a part of the
dedicatory proceedings for their new law building. We went to Allen's office, into which he had
just moved, and chatted with him there. In a desperate effort to contribute at least some small
talk to the conversation, I commented, nodding in the direction of four water or steam pipes
running from floor to ceiling through the office, that this would be a nice office when it was
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len might have consigned me to some sort of Gehenna for the witless,
but he did not. Indeed, in the intervening quarter of a century our
paths have crossed on numerous occasions, often at his doing and always to my benefit.
I reveal no special insight when I assert that Frank Allen is truly
an extraordinary individual. Putting aside his acute nomadism, which
I have addressed on a prior occasion2 and with which he is now afflicted once again, 3 Allen has no fault known to me. He is an unpretentious man in a profession where humility is in short supply.
Moreover, it can truly be said (to turn Churchill's oft-quoted quip inside out) that Frank is a modest man who has nothing to be modest
about. Over the years, despite the burdens of a variety of administrative responsibilities he has assumed for his law school and his profession, Allen has been remarkably prolific. His writings, as I have
already intimated, reflect a singular synthesis of erudition, elegance,
and lucidity; no wonder, then, that his books and articles have so
many admirers and so few equipollents. Allen is a man of grace, good
humor, and uncommon common sense, and he always (well, almost
always4 ) has about him an air of total unflappability.
finished. Allen responded that it was finished. So much for my introduction to the marvels of
modem architecture.
I would like to believe that my faux pas had a subliminal effect upon Allen's career. Despite
his vagabondage, see note 2 infra, Allen has had an uncommonly long tenure at a law school
housed in what can only be described as a mausoleum.
2. It fell to me to introduce Allen when he delivered the David C. Baum Memorial Lecture
on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the University oflllinois College of Law on April 10, 1975.
I stated in part:
Allen graduated from Northwestern in 1946, from whence he moved to Washington to serve
as law clerk to Justice Vinson during 1946-48, from whence he moved to Chicago to serve
on the Northwestern faculty 1948-53, from whence he moved to Cambridge to be on the
Harvard faculty 1953-56, from whence he moved to Chicago to be on the University of
Chicago faculty 1956-62, from whence he moved to Ann Arbor to serve on the Michigan
faculty 1962-63, from whence he moved to Chicago again to serve on the Chicago faculty
1963-66, from whence he moved to Ann Arbor once again to be on the Michigan faculty
(initially as dean), from whence he moved to Boston in 1974 to serve as a visiting faculty
member at Boston College, from whence he moved back to Ann Arbor and the University of
Michigan, where to the best of my knowledge he is presently in residence. Allen recently
received the prestigious Mayflower Award for his enthusiastic and assiduous support of the
moving and storage business.
3. "Francis A. Allen, the Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law and former dean at the
University of Michigan Law School, will occupy a $1 million endowed chair, the Huber C. Hurst
Eminent Scholar Chair at the University of Florida College of Law this fall." SYLLABUS, June
1986, at 4.
4. Among my valued associations with Frank Allen is our work together on the Editorial
Board for the four-volume Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. One of the Board's meetings was
held on the campus of Stanford University, and on the first day of this scheduled meeting I
encountered Frank in the motel dining room at breakfast. He had a troubled look upon his
visage, so uncharacteristic of one whose countenance customarily exudes unmitigated serenity.
Allen then inquired as to my travels from the airport to the motel, explaining that he had paid
what seemed to him an unduly stiff $50 for his taxi ride. With my characteristic honesty, which
perhaps I should have disengaged on this occasion, I confessed that I had grabbed a city bus at
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B. Frank Writes About the Fourth
Elsewhere in these pages Yale Kamisar and Sanford Kadish
thoughtfully examine the contributions of Francis Allen to the legal
literature. 5 Though I am one of the many who have profited from
Frank's books and articles on a variety of topics, I wish to express a
special debt of gratitude regarding his writings in my particular field of
interest. For most of my life in academe, I have staked out as my
favorite intellectual sandbox the fourth amendment - that is, the law
concerning constitutional limitations upon search and seizure. This
has long been the subject of my own (hopefully not Sisyphean) research and writing. I continue to mine this particular vein of constitutional law not merely because the subject fascinates me, but also
because of my sense of the importance in our society of those rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment. In other words, I share the
judgment of Justice Frankfurter that the fourth amendment occupies
"a place second to none in the Bill of Rights." 6 But whether one subscribes to this seemingly discrepant fourth-is-first numeration or, instead, is a literalist who believes that the fourth is really only fourth,
there is no dissent from the conclusion that Frank Allen's contribution
to the fourth amendment literature has been a most important and
lasting one.
Allen's welcome intrusions onto the fourth amendment scene have
typically been prompted by some momentous development in this
realm of jurisprudence. The circumstances of his birth were such7 that
he was unable to publish an article on the occasion of the Supreme
Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 8 which erected a barrier in
the federal courts to admission of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. But when the Court later, in Wolf v. Colorado, 9
the airport and, upon depositing the paltry sum of fifty cents, had been transported to the street
comer just steps from our motel. As Frank reflected on this 100:1 differential in the cost of this
part of our respective travels, it was apparent that his bacon and eggs were not setting too well.
This is about as flapped as I have ever seen Allen.
This incident, I hasten to add, also caused me untold concern. It later occurred to me that
under these circumstances a man of Allen's punctiliousness doubtless would, in submitting his
travel expenses to our publisher, list only an expenditure of fifty cents for his airport-to-motel
journey. How I now wish that I had possessed the presence of mind to assure him that this
would be unnecessary because, on the basis of what I had just learned from him, my statement of
expenses was going to read $50.
5. Kamisar, Francis A. Allen: "Confront[ing] the Most Explosive Problems" and "Plumbing
All Issues to Their Full Depth Without Fear or Prejudice," 85 MICH. L. REv. 406 (1986); Kadish,
Francis A. Allen -An Appreciation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 401 (1986).
6. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
7. The circumstance to which I refer is its timing; Allen was born five years after Weeks was
handed down.
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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declined to recognize a similar constitutional barrier in the state
courts, Allen responded with a masterful analysis of this development.10 So too when Wolf was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,· 11 Allen
was again quickly on the scene with a penetrating assessment of this
landmark case.1 2
Mention should also be made here of another fourth amendment
piece13 penned by Frank Allen, a concise and pithy article based on
remarks he delivered in 1960 at an International Conference on Criminal Law Administration. 14 At this talk, which I attended and vividly
recall, Frank addressed the subject in his customary eloquent style,
but there was not so much as a hint that a few months down the road
the Supreme Court would be making history with the Mapp decision
(so much for the infallibility of Frank Allen). 15 There was a good
reason, of course, why Allen's crystal ball did not foretell this impendency. Until the Supreme Court's decision was announced, Mapp
seemed to be nothing more than a grubby little obscenity case. But
then, as the dissenters bitterly complained, the majority "reached out,,
to overrule Wolf. (How times have changed; nowadays the Court
reaches out to constrict the Mapp exclusionary rule. 16)
C. Frank's Right About the Fourth

The depth and breadth of the analysis in Frank Allen's writings on
the subject are such that those of us who have since labored in the
fourth amendment vineyards have, for the most part, been able to do
10. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L.
REV. 1 (1950).
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf. 1961 SUP. Cr. REV.
1.
13. It should also be noted here that Allen has also addressed fourth amendment issues in
some of his other writings of broader scope. See, e.g., Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice:
The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518.
14. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law ofSearch and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 246 (1961).
IS. The later-published article, however, included an addendum taking note of the intervening decision in Mapp. Id. at 253-54.
Not long thereafter, Allen attempted to vindicate himself with the palliation that the Court
had sneaked up on him (and the rest of us). "The fact is that Mapp did not come as the climax to
an extended process of gradual weakening or attenuation of the Wolf rule. After all the clues are
marshalled, the sense of surprise induced by the announcement of the Mapp decision remains."
Allen, supra note 12, at 11.
16. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 961-62 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
It is probable, though admittedly not certain, that the Court of Appeals would now conclude that the warrant in Leon satisfied the Fourth Amendment if it were given the opportunity to reconsider the issue in the light of Gates. Adherence to our normal practice
following the announcement of a new rule would therefore postpone, and probably obviate,
the need for the promulgation of the broad new rule the Court announces today.
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no more than apply a contemporary sheen to A'llen's pearls (except, of
course, when we are busy mixing metaphors). I find it not at all remarkable that this should be so. Indeed, I would go so far as to say
that anyone who has reason to address fourth amendment issues and I would include here the members of that august body formerly
known as "The Nine Old Men" 17 - would be well advised to study
and excerpt from Allen's timeless Wolf and Mapp articles.
I do not question for a moment the sapience of Robert Benchley's
bon mot that "the surest way to make a monkey of a man is to quote
him." 18 Nor do I doubt that quoting what a man has written twentyfive or thirty-five years ago is the most likely route to this lower-primatial state. But Frank Allen must be the exception who proves the rule,
for his ratiocinations are just as cogent today as when they were written. Indeed, if the intervening years prove anything, they show that
the fourth amendment would be in much better health if Allen's views
had achieved greater acceptance by the courts. Before turning to the
main business of this Article, I should like to provide just two illustrations, one from his 1950 Wolf critique and the other from his 1961
exegesis of Mapp.
1. Standing (and) (for) Deterrence
In a skillfully crafted paragraph in his Wolf piece, Allen pointed
out the inherent inconsistency in having an exclusionary rule
grounded largely in considerations of deterrence and also, as to that
rule, a standing requirement that a defendant's own right of privacy
must have been invaded by the challenged search. 19 That antilogy
17. See Baker, The Ages of Person, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1981, at 23, col. 1, for a lucid
explanation of why that term cannot be supplanted with any of the following: "eight old men
and an old woman"; "eight old men and a spring chicken"; "eight old men and a lady"; and
"eight old men and a person." He concludes: "Under the circumstances, ... the only possible
phrase is 'eight old persons and a person.' Thus dies another lively phrase."
18. R. FLESCH, THE NEW BOOK OF UNUSUAL QUOTATIONS 311 (1966).
19. Perhaps the least justifiable of the limits on the scope of the exclusionary rule recognized by the federal courts is that sanctioning the introduction of evidence in a criminal
proceeding seized in violation of the rights of privacy of a third party. This limitation doubtless reveals the thought that the exclusionary rule should be conceived as conferring a kind
of personal privilege to be asserted only by the individual whose rights of privacy have been
invaded and, perhaps, manifests the origin of the exclusionary rule as the offspring of the
"mystic union" of the Fourth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination derived from the Fifth Amendment. But, obviously, the function of the exclusionary rule is
not simply to confer a benefit upon the defendant in vindication of his rights of privacy
which have already been invaded by governmental action, but to act as a restraining measure upon officials disposed to invade individual privacy in the future and, more broadly, to
prevent the judicial power from being employed as an instrument for the lawless enforcement of the criminal law. Insofar as these latter considerations are of importance it can
make little difference whether the evidence in question represents the fruits of an invasion of
the defendant's rights of privacy or whether it has been obtained in a manner inconsistent
with the rights of any other person entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
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persists today, for in the intervening years the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its unwillingness to broaden standing and thereby
permit deterrence-via-exclusion to be effectuated in a wider range of
circumstances.
In Alderman v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court declined to
adopt the version of standing accepted in People v. Martin, 21 whereunder a defendant in a criminal case could have suppressed even that
evidence obtained in violation of the rights of others. (That rule prevailed in the aptly-mottoed Eureka State until 1982, when it was referendumed into oblivion by Proposition 8. 22) The Court reasoned that
whatever added deterrence would be gained by a Martin-type rule was
not worth the "further encroachment upon the public interest" that
would result. 23 Alderman was thus viewed as having marked the
"point of diminishing returns" 24 of the exclusionary rule, which is an
attractive way of looking at the question. If the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule is viewed in terms of "its broad deterrent purpose, "25 then, so the argument goes, it is "a needed, but grudgingly
taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed than is needed to
combat the disease." 26 How much is enough, however, is a hard question, and can lead to the kind of speculation about deterrence-in-fact
objurgated in the following subsection. But at least Alderman protected against certain results which had occurred under Martin that
were themselves hard to swallow, such as that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have excluded at his trial evidence acquired by
police in violation of the rights of his victim. 21
Allen, supra note 10, at 22 (footnotes omitted).
20. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
21. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). For a useful study of the experience in California
under the Martin rule, see Simons, Califomia's Rule of Vicarious Exclusion: Who May Challenge
the Constable's Errors?, 19 SANTA Cl.ARA L. REV. 319 (1979).
22. In 1982 California voters adopted an amendment to the state constitution providing,
among other things: "[E]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of
the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 28(d). This was construed as having "abrogated •••
the 'vicarious exclusionary rule' under which a defendant had standing to object to the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the rights of a third person." In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d
873, 879, 694 P.2d 744, 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (1985).
23. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 175.
24. Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in Califomia, 24 STAN. L. REV. 947, 958 (1972).
25. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
26. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378,
389 (1964).
27. People v. Jager, 145 Cal. App. 2d 792, 303 P.2d 115 (1956), cited as an "extreme example
of the California position" in Note, Standing Requirement of the Fourth Amendment -Anachronism or Necessity?, 6 IDAHO L. REv. 131, 134 (1969), opposing the Martin rule. Compare
Simons, supra note 21, at 346-47, taking the position that standing even in such circumstances is
appropriate.
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After Alderman, the question of whether a defendant should have
standing because he was the target of a search directed at another was
"regarded as an open question," 28 but it was abruptly closed in Rakas
v. Illinois, 29 which rejected any such notion. In a remarkable passage,
the Court reasoned that the unprosecuted victim of that search could
seek other remedies (thus turning the Mapp analysis on its head), and
expressed concern about the "substantial social cost" attendant application of the exclusionary rule. 30 One might have expected some balancing of that supposed cost against the deterrent advantages of
exclusion, by way of determining on which side of the "target" standing concept the. :'diminishing returns" of exclusion set in, but that did
not happen. Instead, the Court adopted an individual rights approach
to the fourth amendment, 31 conveniently ignoring the fact that it had
previously characterized the exclusionary remedy as "designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 32
"Target" standing makes eminently good sense if otherwise "the
Supreme Court's 'standing' rules [would] constitute an incitement to
the police to conduct unconstitutional searches against small fish in
order to catch big ones." 33 Commentators have argued that there are
recurring situations in which such trade-offs are made, 34 but any
doubts on this point were certainly dispelled by the remarkable case of
United States v. Payner. 35 There an IRS agent, knowing a Bahamian
bank official would be in Miami, participated in a scheme whereby the
banker's briefcase was stolen for a time to facilitate photographing of
400 bank records therein. This led to information establishing that
Payner and others had money in that bank not reported on their tax
returns. As was unmistakably clear in the findings of the district
court, 36 undisturbed by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court,
28. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
30. 439 U.S. at 137.
31. Doemberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests
Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259, 262 (1983), notes that Rakas was another in a series of cases in which "the Court in recent years has oscillated between individual
and collective views in the fourth amendment [exclusionary] rule area, but always in such a way
as to narrow the amendment's effective ambit."
32. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
33. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 433 (1974).
34. See Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 176-77 (1979); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 351-52 (1970).
35. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
36. The findings were that
the Government and its agents, including Richard Jaffe, were, and are, well aware that
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this criminal act and extreme violation of the banker's fourth amendment rights37 was undertaken with full understanding by the IRS
agent that a person such as Payner - precisely the kind of violator
they were seeking - would have no standing to object. The Supreme
Court, however, refused to reconsider its fourth amendment standing
doctrine and then reversed the district court's exclusion of evidence
under its supervisory power. As the three Payner dissenters quite correctly said of this holding that compels judicial impotency in the face
of such scandalous conduct, it "effectively turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment violations into
a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to
invade one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another person."38
Allen's comments of over thirty-five years ago about deterrence
and standing are most poignant when viewed against these more recent developments. The complaint is not that the Supreme Court has
failed to squeeze the very last ounce of deterrence39 out of the excluunder the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained from a party
pursuant to an unconstitutional search is admissible against third parties who's [sic] own
privacy expectations are not subject to the search, even though the cause for the unconstitu·
tional search was to obtain evidence incriminating those third parties. This Court finds that,
in its desire to apprehend tax evaders, .•• the Government affinnatively counsels its agents
that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation pennits them to purposefully conduct an
unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against
third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents
in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to that counsel.
434 F. Supp. 113, 131-33 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (footnote omitted).
37. In a pre-Payner lecture on fourth amendment issues, I had occasion to discuss United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), holding that the defendant could not object to subpoenas
ordering production by banks of "all records of accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan or otherwise, in the name of" defendant or his company, for the reason that he had no reasonable expec·
tation of privacy as to what was in those documents, for they "contain[ed] only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business." 425 U.S. at 437, 442. In expressing my lack of enthusiasm for the Miller rationale
and result, I opined that if the Court's reasoning were taken seriously then this would mean the
same result would obtain even if the police acquired the bank records without the bank's consent
and by some extreme measures, such as burglary. The (admittedly hostile) audience almost
hooted me from the podium for entertaining such flights of fancy. Payner, of course, is precisely
such a case.
38. 447 U.S. at 738 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
39. The relevance in this context of the sempiternal verity that "an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure" is open to debate. Indeed, that is the very heart of the debate. The
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court instructed in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), "is calculated to prevent, not to repair." If it is prevention we are
talking about, then it might seem that every available ounce should be extruded from the exclu·
sionary rule. But while it is indubitably accurate to say of the exclusionary rule that the "empha·
sis is forward," Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 335,
there is no escaping the fact that the apparent (even if not always actual) "immediate result is to
free an obviously guilty person." Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment:
The Limits ofLawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 331 (1973). It is the prospect of that more immediate
consequence which doubtless has influenced the Supreme Court and lower courts to accept some·
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sionary rule. Rather, it is that the standing doctrine has been fashioned in such a way that it is actually working at cross-purposes with
the deterrence objective. Nor, it should be added, is this a consequence only of the Court refusing to enlarge upon previously recognized standing doctrine. It is also reflected in those cases, such as
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 40 that rule on just what it takes to establish the
"legitimate expectation of privacy" the Court said in Rakas was essential to standing. The Rawlings Court held defendant was without
standing as to his then-companion's purse, into which he had placed
narcotics, because he did not "have any right to exclude other persons
from access to [that] purse."41 By thus using a consideration previously deemed relevant on the authority of a bailee to give valid consent,42 the Court produced the incredible result that whenever police
could conduct a lawful search with the bailee's consent, they may instead make that search without the bailee's consent because the bailor
will lack standing.43 This is not only wrong, but also inconsistent with
the Court's prior pronouncements on the law of standing.44
2.

Deterrence -

Prove It!

In his 1961 Mapp article, Allen took note of the longstanding
"[d]ebate over the efficacy of the exclusionary rule," a matter that
"can ultimately be answered only by empirical demonstration," but
not now, for "no effective quantitative measure of the rule's deterrent
efficacy has been devised or applied."45 Allen rightly saw this as an
unhealthy state of affairs. As he put the matter on a subsequent occasion: "The reason why the deterrence rationale renders the exclusionary rule vulnerable is that the case for the rule as an effective deterrent
of police misbehavior has proved, at best, to be an uneasy one."46
The wisdom of this Allenism has been amply demonstrated by
Yale Kamisar in an article which, like the present one, is cognomened
thing less than every possible ounce of prevention. As Justice Traynor put it: "Of all the twofaced problems of the law, there is none more tormenting" than this. Traynor, supra, at 319.
40. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
41. 448 U.S. at 105.
42. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 8.6(a) (2d ed. 1987).
43. As in Sussman v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1980) {defendant had no standing regarding search of his girl friend's house, where he had left certain personal effects, including a stash of drugs, as he had not limited his girl friend's use of the premises).
44. For example, in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1968), where the Court held
an office worker had standing as to a search of records in an office used by him and his coworkers, it was properly said to be "irrelevant" that his employer and fellow employees "might
validly have consented to a search of the area where the records were kept."
45. Allen, supra note 12, at 33-34.
46. Allen, supra note 13, at 537.
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with Allen's distinctive prose.47 That being the case, I shall not serve
the reader a rechauffe here, but instead will offer only a few observations on the significance of Allen's point. One view is that it means the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule must be seen as grounded not in
notions of deterrence but rather in the broader proposition (as also
stated in Mapp) that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence.'' Kamisar argues this point with his characteristic bulldog
tenacity, 48 while others have vigorously taken the contrary position.49
Wherever the truth lies in this dispute (notice how I have absquatulated from that battleground with all haste), I would suggest
that it is difficult to think about the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule without also thinking about the objective of deterrence. (Even
Kamisar once said - back when he was young and innocent, he might
now protest - that he "would hate to have to justify throwing out
homicide and narcotic and labor racket cases" if he "did not believe
that such action significantly affected police attitudes and practices.''50) But the heart of the problem is exactly how one ought to
think about deterrence and the fourth amendment.
Allen's concern is with deterrence as "an empirical proposition,''51
where an absence of hard proof of a deterrent effect in the particular
case might well be taken as a reason for not excluding illegally obtained evidence in that case. But that, it seems to me, is a cockeyed
way for courts to look at deterrence. I am comfortable in thinking
about the exclusionary rule in deterrence terms, but that is because I
see the deterrence principle somewhat differently. For one thing, I
find the question of whether the exclusionary rule (did) (could) deter
in the particular case irrelevant, for the "exclusionary rule is not
aimed at special deterrence"; 52 instead it is intended "to discourage
law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by
removing the incentive to disregard it. " 53 Moreover, the claim that the
deterrent effect must somehow be proved in a particular instance "is
merely a way of announcing a predetermined conclusion," 54 for with
47. Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather
Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983).
48. Id.
49. E.g., Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 918-22 (1986).
50. Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 171, 179 (1962).
51. Allen, supra note 12, at 34.
52. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 709
(1970).
53. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
54. Dworkin, supra note 39, at 333.
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the exclusionary rule (as with the death penalty) it is "difficult to measure the occasions on which the deterrent has been successful." 55 In
the last analysis, then, I share the belief that deterrence "is partly a
matter oflogic and psychology, largely a matter of faith. The question
is never whether laws do deter, but rather whether conduct ought to
be deterred." 56
For me, then, the ultimate proof of the wisdom of Allen's comment is the Court's insistence on treating deterrence as "an ~mpirical
proposition" in the sense discussed above. I have in mind such cases
as United States v. Janis, 57 where, utilizing "common sense" in "the
absence of convincing empirical evidence," the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in a civil suit by or against a sovereign other
than that employing the searching officer, though in fact (as the dissenters recognized) such a result could only fortify the existing pattern
"of mutual cooperation and coordination"58 whereby evidence illegally seized by state officers was being silver-plattered59 to federal officials for use in enforcing their tax laws. Similarly in INS v. LopezMendoza 60 the exclusionary rule was held inapplicable in a civil deportation hearing, in part because INS agents know "that it is highly
unlikely that any particular arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest," 61 though (as Justice White noted in dissent) so
concentrating on deterrence of individual agents "neglects the 'systemic' deterrent effect that may lead the agency to adopt policies and
procedures that conform to Fourth Amendment standards." 62

II.

THE NEED FOR "FACTUALIZATION"

The inspiration for this Article comes from the following paragraph, written by Frank Allen in 1950:
So long as the Court feels itself compelled to resolve [fourth amendment] issues by choosing one set of social values to the exclusion of the
other, any decision must inevitably leave the law in a state of unstable
equilibrium. In other types of civil liberties litigation there may be evi55. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 736,
739 (1972).
56. Dworkin, supra note 39, at 333.
57. 428 U.S. 433, 457, 459 (1976).
58. 428 U.S. at 462 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. The reference, of course, is to the so-called "silver platter'' doctrine, under which state
police could tum the fruits of their illegal searches over to federal authorities for use in federal
courts; the doctrine was abolished in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and has now
been partially revived in Janis.
60. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
61. 468 U.S. at 1044.
62. 468 U.S. at 1054 (White, J., dissenting).
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dence that these tensions are relaxing due to the increasing ability of the
Court to narrow the issues for adjudication, thereby eliminating choices
between such drastic alternatives. Thus by a process of "factualization"
it may be increasingly easier to recognize that the problem of freedom of
speech in an industrial dispute is not altogether the same problem as that
involving the right of the political candidate to make his views known to
the electorate, and that the right of the unlicensed newspaper publisher
to be free from governmental supervision in the circulation of ideas may
not involve precisely the same implications as the issue of governmental
supervision of the quality of programs put on the air by the licensee of a
radio wave length. However that may be, this process of "factualization" in the search and seizure cases has not proceeded far. Consequently, those cases present in particularly stark relief a conflict of social
values typical to a greater or lesser extent of the dilemmas faced by the
Court in the whole movement toward increasing judicial protection of
the basic individual liberties. 6 3

When those words were written, the fourth amendment landscape
was rather barren. Thus it could quite accurately be said, as Allen
does, that while the Court had come to appreciate that not all forms of
speech were entitled to precisely the same kind and degree of first
amendment protection, there had not yet developed a full understanding that not every form of search or of seizure should be subject to
precisely the same kind and degree of fourth amendment limitation.
Rather, the Court's decisions for the most part treated the fourth
amendment "as a monolith: wherever it restricts police activities at
all, it subjects them to the same extensive restrictions that it imposes
upon physical entries into dwellings. To label any police activity a
'search' or 'seizure' within the ambit of the amendment is to impose
those restrictions upon it." 64
Moreover, at the time of Allen's 1950 assessment, the Court's efforts to erect at least some guideposts on the fourth amendment terrain had not been especially successful. Consider what the Court had
said over a span of thirty-five years concerning the permissible scope
of search incident to arrest: Dictum first approved search of the "person, "65 then for what might be "found upon his person or in his control,"66 and then more broadly of the person and "the place where the
arrest is made. " 67 This was followed by a holding allowing search of
"all parts of the premises" where an arrest for contemporaneous criminal conduct was made, 68 which was succeeded in tum by the seeming
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Allen, supra note 10, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 388 (footnote omitted).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
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discordancies that a search incident to arrest was impermissible when
of the office where the arrest occurred, 69 permissible when of a fourroom apartment in which the arrest was made,70 impermissible when
of a farm building in which the arrest happened,7 1 and permissible
when of an office in which the arrest was accomplished.72 Little wonder that Justice Frankfurter was moved to aphorize, upon tal<lng note
of this remarkable bit of nonsequaciousness, that "the course of true
law pertaining to searches and seizures ... has not ... run smooth."73
In the succeeding thirty-five years or so the Court has added one
more case to that series,74 still another shift75 which, however, seems
to "have legs~:. in the show-biz sense.76 During this same span the
Court has handed down a profusion of cases which, collectively, have
substantially accomplished a "factualization" of the fourth amendment. This more recent fourth amendment jurisprudence has not always "run smooth" either, though it is fair to say that in this modem
era the Court's search and seizure decisions have been marked by a
greater degree of consistency than is reflected in the above summary.
These cases, or at least some of them, are not without their analytical
and practical difficulties (about which more in a moment), but viewed
in their totality they reflect a most desirable trend: the ongoing development and elaboration of two most important fourth amendment
principles, namely (1) that not every search and not every seizure must
be grounded in the traditional quantum of evidence suggested by the
amendment's "probable cause" requirement, and (2) that not every
search and not every seizure is "unreasonable" (in the sense in which
that word is used in the amendment) merely because the warrant process was not utilized.

III.

LESSER GROUNDS FOR SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

In recent years, the Supreme Court has on several occasions recognized that the police are entitled to conduct certain types of searches
69. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
70. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
71. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
72. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
73. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
74. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
75. The Court in Chime/ held the warrantless search of the arrest premises may not "go
beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items."
395 U.S. at 766.
76. Though Chime/ might appear to be in at least some jeopardy as a consequence of the
Court's adoption of a broader rule as to search of vehicles incident to arrest in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), Belton purports to be grounded in considerations unique to vehicles.
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and seizures, though they are admittedly actions subject to the restraints of the fourth amendment,77 upon a less demanding factual basis than had often been required theretofore. Though it is not at all
uncommon for these situations to be characterized as searches and
seizures conducted without probable cause,78 it is much more precise
to say that they are searches and seizures permitted on something less
than the traditional quantum of probable cause. 79 These searches and
seizures may be usefully further classified by placing them into three
categories, the first two of which have a common antecedent.
Category (1) involves those searches and seizures allowed upon the
basis of what is most commonly referred to as "reasonable suspicion"
- a case-by-case ascertainment of some likelihood that the seizure or
search will be fruitful, which, however, as a matter of probabilities
need not rise to the level of traditional probable cause. Category
(2) involves those searches and seizures which are permitted without
any case-by-case suspicion at all, provided they are carried out pursuant to some established routine and in that sense are neither accusatory nor arbitrary in nature. Both categories are grounded in the
Supreme Court's so-called "balancing test," and thus together raise
difficult issues about just how and in what circumstances such balancing is to be conducted.
Category (3), on the other hand, has to do with certain searches
and seizures which are permitted simply because of their nexus to
other lawful fourth amendment activity. Most commonly found in
this category are instances in which a search is allowed merely because
it is contemporaneous with, or at least in some sense "incident to," the
making of a seizure. Sometimes, however, it is a seizure that is permitted because of its adjunction to a coincident search. But all of the
cases in this category are grounded in a common assumption: that
this added authority must be "piggy-backed" in this way onto the
power to make the underlying seizure or search because a more metic77. Another important part of the "factualization" process not discussed in this Article has
to do with when the police conduct falls outside the fourth amendment and thus is subject to no
constitutional restraints whatsoever. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) ("factory
surveys" in effort to find illegal aliens at their workplaces not a search or seizure); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (insertion of "beeper" in container before its sale and later use of
same to follow car no search or seizure). It is this aspect of the Court's "factualization" process
which perhaps has been least satisfactory. Many of the activities deemed outside the fourth
amendment entirely, such as those involved in the two cases just cited, would better be viewed as
inside the amendment but subject to lesser limitations, as with the activities discussed herein.
78. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting there are "two types of seizures that need not be based on probable cause").
79. This circumvents the complaint made by Justice Douglas in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36
(1968) (dissenting opinion}, that the majority had permitted the police on their own to do what a
magistrate could not permit via warrant, as a warrant requires probable cause.
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ulous definition of the "incident to" authority would unduly complicate an already complex situation. The cases in this third category,
then, all involve the bedeviling question of when resort to "bright
lines" is appropriate in defining police authority.
A. Reasonable Suspicion
1.

Brief Seizure of Persons

Back in the "monolith" days of the fourth amendment, the lawfulness of a street encounter between an officer and a suspect was usually
determined by the rather mechanical process of ascertaining whether
an "arrest" had occurred. 80 But any seizure was treated as ipso facto
and, to be sure, ipso jure an "arrest,'' 81 which resulted in a most unhealthy situation. Necessary police power to investigate suspicious circumstances was consequently unavailable, except as it was conferred
by either of two less than desirable means: manipulation of the substantive criminal law to overcome this procedural difficulty; 82 or watering-down of the grounds needed to make any arrest. It is thus fair
to say that in its "factualization" of the fourth amendment, the
Supreme Court's most profound contribution was its seminal decision
of Terry v. Ohio. 8 3
As is now generally known, the Court in Terry utilized its balancing test, defined the year before in Camara v. Municipal Court 84 in
terms of "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails,'' by applying it now to the common police practice of
detaining suspicious persons briefly on the street for purposes of investigation. The thrust of Terry and its progeny may be expressed in
these terms: The requirement of probable cause is a compromise for
accommodating the opposing interests of the public in crime prevention and detection, and of individuals in privacy and security. 85 The
same compromise is not called for in all situations, and thus this balancing process should take account of precisely what lies in the bal80. E.g., People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S. 326 (N.Y. Sp. Sess. 1922).
81. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1957) (holding the suspect had
been arrested when taken by an officer to a nearby call box); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp.
837, 840 (D.D.C. 1959) (holding that the suspect had been arrested when taken from the street to
his nearby apartment, as "the term arrest may be applied to any case where a person is taken into
custody or restrained of his full liberty, or where the detention of a person in custody is continued even for a short period of time") (quoting Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir.
1934)).
82. See LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police,
45 TEXAS L. REV. 434, 451 & n.77 (1967).
83. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
84. 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
85. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).

442

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:427

ance in a given case. Because one variable is the degree of imposition
on the individual, it may be postulated that less evidence is needed to
meet the probable cause test when the consequences for the individual
are less serious. Thus, it may be concluded that a brief on-the-street
seizure does not require as much evidence of probable cause as one
which involves taking the individual to the station, as the former is
relatively short, less conspicuous, less humiliating to the person, and
offers less chance for police coercion than the latter. This means that a
Terry stop, as the Court none too helpfully put it in that case, is proper
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot." 86 As the Court later elaborated in United States v.
Cortez, 87 though no "self-defining" verbal formula exists, the essence
of the standard is that "the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity."
If there are to be two tiers 88 of probable cause, a higher level for a
full-fledged arrest and a lower one for a Terry stop, then quite obviously it is essential to the effective and fair functioning of this scheme
that there exist a rational means for distinguishing between these two
varieties of fourth amendment activity. Terry set the tone for developments along this line by making it clear that the matter was not to be
decided merely on the basis of the labels chosen by the police or by the
state; as one commentator put it, the Court in Terry "dissipated the
notion that the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment
are subject to verbal manipulation." 89 If it walks like a duck, quacks
like a duck, and flys like a duck, then it must be a duck! The Court
said as much in Dunaway v. New York, 90 where the defendant confessed after being picked up and brought to the station for a brief period of questioning. Though he had not been told that he was under
arrest and had not been booked, the Court wisely rejected the state's
claim that only the lesser quantum of evidence for a Terry stop was
needed. The Court reasoned that "the detention of petitioner was in
86. 392 U.S. at 30.
87. 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
88. Without necessarily suggesting that the balancing which permits something less than the
traditional quantum of probable cause will inevitably require exactly the same amount of evidence, the Court has declined to adopt more than two verbal standards, reasoning that "subtle
verbal gradations may obscure rather than elucidate the meaning of the provision in question."
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
89. Remarks of Justice Walter V. Schaefer at Institute of Continuing Legal Education pro·
gram on "Criminal Law and the Constitution: The Expanding Revolution," Ann Arbor, Michi·
gan, July 19, 1968.
90. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest," as he
"was not questioned briefly where he was found" but instead was
"transported to a police station" and "would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to
escape their custody." 91 Just as wisely, the Supreme Court has quite
correctly concluded that it is appearances rather than intentions which
should govern on this issue, so that a brief seizure may pass muster as
a Terry stop even when the officer viewed the event as the initial stage
of a full-fledged arrest.92
This is not to suggest that placing a particular set of facts within
the proper compartment of the now-dimerous "seizure" category is
always easy. Consider Florida v. Royer, 93 where a suspected drug courier was lawfully questioned in an airport concourse and then required
to accompany the police about forty feet to a small police office, where
he consented to a search of his suitcases after they were obtained from
the airline and brought to the room. Although the total lapsed time
was fifteen minutes, the four-Justice plurality concluded that the consent was the fruit of an illegal arrest. Some of the plurality's language
suggests these Justices viewed the situation as equivalent to a taking to
a police station a la Dunaway, for it was stressed that Royer was held
in "a police interrogation room." But they placed greater emphasis
upon the asserted requirements that a Terry stop "last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and that "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short
period of time." 94 These requirements were not met here, the plurality
reasoned, as "the primary interest of the officers was . . . in the contents of his luggage," 95 and thus they could have more expeditiously
sought consent on the spot or could have used a narcotics detection
dog, available at the airport, to check out the suitcase. 96 This "least
intrusive means" inquiry has a great potential for mischief, especially
if a court goes about it in the fashion of the Royer plurality. The plurality appears to have assumed that use of a detection dog is inevitably
"more expeditious," though in fact such dogs are not always readily
91. 442 U.S. at 212.
92. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
93. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
94. 460 U.S. at 500.
95. 460 U.S. at 505.
96. Brennan, J., concurring, while unwilling to concede that use of trained narcotics dogs
would be less intrusive, expressed a view which - if anything - was even more demanding:
"[A] lawful stop must be so strictly limited that it is difficult to conceive of a less intrusive means
that would be effective to accomplish the purpose of the stop." 460 U.S. at 511 n. *.
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available (as the Court learned later that Term97). Similarly, the
Royer plurality also implied that seeking consent is not expeditious.
In fact, however, a consent might be very promptly obtained or, if not
or if there is not time for a search before the suspect's flight departs, he
might be allowed to go his way and the investigation continued at his
destination (again, as the Court learned later that Term98). Fortunately, the Supreme Court has more recently cautioned against "unrealistic second-guessing," and has declared that the "question is not
simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the
police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it." 99
2.

Brief Seizure of Effects

Certainly the lesser-intrusion-ergo-lesser-suspicion concept of
Terry has application in some other settings as well. Thus, for example, the Court in United States v. Place 100 properly applied the Terry
balancing of interests approach in concluding that the luggage possessed by reasonably suspected drug couriers at airports could be
seized and detained while further investigation (typically, exposure of
the suitcases to a drug-detection dog) was conducted. Place illustrates
the care with which the Terry balancing process must be undertaken.
The Court most wisely cautioned that "in the case of detention of luggage within the traveler's immediate possession, 101 the police conduct
intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage as well
as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary," in that "such a
seizure can effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the
possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return." 102 For this reason, the Court concluded in Place, "the limitations applicable to investigative detentions
of the person" also apply here. 103 In other words, the container may
be detained without full probable cause only as long as could the sus97. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the suspect's luggage was held for 90
minutes so that it could be taken from LaGuardia Airport to Kennedy Airport where such a dog
was available.
98. In Place, the suspect promptly consented to a search of his bags in Miami, but he was
allowed to depart instead because his flight was about to leave; the investigation was continued in
New York City. 462 U.S. at 698-99.
99. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985).
100. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
101. As compared to a situation like that in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249
(1970), upholding a longer detention of a mailed package because the invasion did not intrude
upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the
package.
102. 462 U.S. at 708.
103. 462 U.S. at 709.
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pect from whose possession it was taken, so that the suspect at his
option may also remain at the place of the seizure for that length of
time and then reclaim the container, unless in the interim the suspicion has blossomed into probable cause.
3.

Limits of the Category

Just how far the Terry balancing approach should be pushed so as
to permit certain seizures or searches on reasonable suspicion rather
than full probable cause is unclear, though it would seem that in New
Jersey v. T.L.0. 104 the Court reached - if it did not surpass - the
limit. T.L.O. holds that "the Fourth Amendment' applies to searches
conducted by school authorities," 105 but that such warrantless
searches are permissible if the search of the student was justified at its
inception (i.e., by "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either
the law or the rules of the school") and reasonable in scope (i.e., by
measures "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction"). 106 But the Court's reasoning leaves much
to be desired.
For one thing, the Court justified its departure from usual fourth
amendment standards by noting that "drug use and violent crime in
the schools have become major social problems," 107 but yet promulgated a search standard (as Justice Stevens bemoaned) that makes "a
search for curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress
code ... just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction
and violent gang activity." 108 For another, the T.L.O. majority simply
assumed that the "school setting also requires some modification of
the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search," 109 an
assumption not justified by the facts of T.L. 0. itself (or, indeed, the
reported school search cases generally 110), where the available evidence sufficed to meet the traditional probable cause test. Finally, the
majority's balancing analysis is largely silent on the degree-of-intrusion point, understandably prompting the dissenters to say of the case,
which involved a vice principal's search into a female student's purse,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

469
469
469
469
469
469

U.S. 325 (1985).
U.S. at 337.
U.S. at 342.
U.S. at 339.
U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. at 340.
See 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 42, at§ 10.ll(b).
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that it cannot be squared with the principle "that probable cause is a
prerequisite for a full-scale search."111
B. Standardized Procedures

1. Inspection of Premises

The seminal standardized-procedures case is Camara v. Municipal
Court, 112 where the Court ruled that a search warrant was required for
nonconsensual health and safety inspections of residential premises,
but then held that such a warrant could issue despite the absence of
any facts tending to show that code violations existed in the premises
to be inspected. Specifically, the Court decided
that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such
standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced,
may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a
multifamily apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but
they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. 113

In the companion case of See v. City of Seattle, 114 the same result was
reached as to commercial premises.
The result reached in Camara, arrived at by "balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails," 115 is sound. The
case thus stands as another very important contribution to the "factualization" of the fourth amendment. However, the Court's discussion
of the "persuasive factors" in the balance leaves something to be desired, and reflects just how easy it would be for courts to run amuck
with this balancing test and, in the process, to balance the fourth
amendment away entirely. Consider, for example, the statement in
Camara that "the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results." 116 It is difficult to
accept this asserted need for "universal compliance" with housing
code standards as a justification for a diluted probable cause test; one
might just as cogently argue that there is a need for universal compliance with the criminal law and that the public interest demands that
all dangerous offenders be convicted and punished. As four of the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
523 (1967).
at 538.
541 (1967).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
387 U.S. at 537.

469
387
387
387

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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Camara majority had noted on an earlier occasion: "Health inspections are important. But they are hardly more important than the
search for narcotic peddlers, rapists, kidnappers, murderers, and other
criminal elements." 117 A more fruitful line of analysis, therefore,
would focus instead upon the Camara Court's asserted need for "acceptable results." Criminal law enforcement typically is directed toward aggressive conduct, most often occurring in public places, which
usually leaves a trail of discernible facts. As a consequence, the traditional probable cause test has not proved to be a bar to an acceptable
level of criminal law enforcement, as the instances are rare in which
the preparation, commission, and all evidence of an offense are confined to the offender's private premises. By comparison, most housing
code violations occur within private premises, cannot be detected from
outside, and are not brought to the attention of the authorities by complaint. It is these facts which support the Court's expression of doubt
"that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable
results."
Another Camara factor is that "the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime" and
consequently "involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." 118 Though this might be read to mean that a lesser
quantum of evidence will suffice when the object of the search is not
criminal prosecution, such an interpretation would be unfortunate and
erroneous. As four members of the Camara majority put it in an earlier case, an individual's interest in privacy "would not appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the invading officers." 119 Thus a more
appropriate interpretation of this Camara factor is that a lesser quantum of evidence suffices for these inspections because the search involved is less of an intrusion on personal privacy and dignity than that
which generally occurs in the course of criminal investigation. This is
a real and meaningful distinction. Code inspections (in contrast to the
typical search for evidence of crime) are completed quickly, involve no
rummaging through the private papers and effects of the householder,
and do not result in a seizure. Also, while a police search for evidence
brings with it "damage to reputation resulting from an overt manifestation of official suspicion of crime," 120 a routine inspection that is
117. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 382 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren,
C.J., and Black and Brennan, JJ.).
118. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
119. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Black and Douglas, JJ.).
120. Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 u. CHI. L. REV. 664, 701 (1961).
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part of a periodic or area inspection plan does not single out any one
person as the object of official suspicion.
The third "persuasive factor" stated in Camara, that code inspection "programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance," 121 is vulnerable from the point of view of both accuracy and
cogency. As for longstanding judicial acceptance, the fact of the matter is that before Camara the few cases reaching the appellate courts
focused almost exclusively on the warrant-no warrant issue. As for
the longstanding public acceptance, it is more accurately described (as
it was on an earlier occasion by four members of the Camara majority)
as a "history of acquiescence." 122 In any event, a similar or even
greater showing of judicial and public acceptance did not deter the
Court in Camara from finding warrantless search procedures constitutionally deficient. (Just as vulnerable is the assumption that if a business is "pervasively regulated" it may for that reason be inspected
without traditional probable cause. As Justice Rehnquist has noted,
the Court would inexorably invalidate an inspection scheme to check
premises for drug activity, "despite the fact that Congress has a strong
interest in regulating and preventing drug-related crime and has in
fact pervasively regulated such crime for a longer period of time than
it has regulated mining."123)
2.

Operation of Checkpoints

A standardized-procedures rationale has the most going for it
when, by virtue of those procedures, the resulting lesser intrusion (be
it seizure or search) (i) is not perceived by the individual affected or by
others as accusatory in nature, and (ii) is not open to the possibility
that it was either a consequence of arbitrary selection or the manifestation of some ulterior motive. This is why what might be characterized
as the "all who pass here" variety of standardized procedures constitutes the epitome of this genre of fourth amendment activity. Illustrative is the operation of a highway checkpoint at which all vehicles are
stopped for brief questioning of the occupants about their possible illegal alienage, upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 124 and the
stopping of all traffic at a roadblock for the purpose of checking
driver's licenses and vehicle registration, approvingly viewed in Delaware v. Prouse. 125 On the basis of Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse, lower
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

387 U.S. at 537.
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (concurring opinion).
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (dictum).
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courts have not surprisingly upheld such other checkpoint procedures
as the airport hijacker detection system, 126 roadblocks to detect drunk
drivers, 127 and the screening of persons entering public buildings
where security is a legitimate concem. 128
3. Limits of the Category
Quite clearly, as is apparent from Justice Rehnquist's observation
quoted above, this standardized-procedures approach cannot be extended to all forms of investigative activity so as, in effect, to subvert
totally the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. But the
Court's process of "factualization" has not identified as yet the boundaries of the Camara principle, and suggestions are to be found that it
might sometimes be applied in more traditional law enforcement contexts. In Brown v. Texas, 129 holding the random and groundless stopping of a person on the street for questioning unconstitutional, the
Court asserted that for such activity to pass constitutional muster
there must be either reasonable suspicion or "the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
the conduct of individual o:ffi.cers." 130 Just how seriously this language
should be taken is unclear; Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse are cited in
support, but in those cases (as with Camara itself) the Court was dealing with some special and unique governmental and public interests
which could not be adequately served if even a case-by-case reasonable
suspicion standard were required. It is thus to be doubted that neutral
"plans" dealing generally with certain constant law enforcement concerns, such as drug trafficking, will emerge and be found sufficient
under the Camara principle. More likely, as some lower court cases
illustrate, 131 is that a stopping without individualized suspicion but
pursuant to a plan will be upheld if the plan addresses a somewhat
"special" problem existing at a certain time and place.
C.

Nexus to Other Lawful Fourth Amendment Activity
1.

On ''Bright Lines"

This third category of seizures and searches without traditional
probable cause is of the "piggy-back" variety; that is, the search or the
126. E.g., People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974).
127. E.g., State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983).
128. E.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 383 Mass. 655, 421 N.E.2d 447 (1981).
129. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
130. 443 U.S. at 51.
131. E.g., People v. Meitz, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 420 N.E.2d 1119 (1981); see also United
States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1979).
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seizure is deemed permissible, even absent any probable cause showing
as to it, because it accompanied some other lawful seizure or search.
The so-called "search incident to arrest" is the prime example. The
recognition of this "piggy-back" authority has commonly been justified on the ground that a more particularized statement of authority to
make an incidental search or seizure would of necessity be so complicated and ambiguous as to be beyond the comprehension of the police.
This third category, then, raises the profoundly important question of
whether this "process of 'factualization' " that Allen talks about
should always entail a very particularized and thorough evaluation of
the unique facts of the individual case, or whether on the other hand it
is sometimes appropriate to set out the rules for police conduct in
terms of general categories - that is, by employing "bright lines."
There are some settings in which it is quite apparent that having
the constitutional limits on police authority set out by bright lines is
meritorious. The Supreme Court has often spoken favorably of its Miranda doctrine as "a bright-line rule," 132 which it most certainly is and
which unquestionably is one of its greatest virtues. The police know
exactly what is expected of them. But when the Court-declared bright
line is not stated in terms of an obligation on the police to do something to protect a person's rights, as is the case in Miranda, but rather
in terms of authority in the police to take some affirmative action benefi.cial to them in a general category of cases (e.g., that the person of an
arrestee may always be searched incident to arrest), then the wisdom
of the bright line is less apparent. One view, as I have elsewhere expressed it, is that
if our aim, as stated in the fourth amendment, is to ensure that "the
people" are "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures," then it may well be that the rules
governing search and seizure are more in need of greater clarity than
greater sophistication. And thus, as between a complicated rule which
in a theoretical sense produces the desired result 100% of the time, but
which well-intentioned police could be expected to apply correctly in
only 75% of the cases, and a readily understood and easily applied rule
which would bring about the theoretically correct conclusion 90% of the
time, the latter is to be preferred over the former. As someone once put
it, an ounce of application is worth a ton of abstraction. 133

But this is hardly a universally acclaimed proposition. Professor Alschuler, for one, 134 has responded to the above with this: "Not only
132. E.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 n.1
(1985).
133. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an lmpelfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITI. L. REV. 307, 321 (1982).
134. Some members of the Supreme Court have also expressed concerns, such as that "ini·
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do categorical fourth amendment rules often lead to substantial injustice; in addition, their artificiality commonly makes them difficult, not
easy, to apply." 135 I shall not renew that debate here; suffice it to note
that I still believe (to put the proposition in Justice White's words)
that "[b]right-line rules are indeed useful and sometimes necessary,"
but that "the Court should move with some care" in creating them. 136
Doubtless one's affinity for a particular bright line depends to some
extent on whose ox is being gored. Thus Justice Rehnquist, author of
the seminal bright-line decision in United States v. Robinson, 137 was
nonetheless moved to declare via dissent in another case "that probably any search for 'bright lines' short of overruling Mapp v. Ohio is apt
to be illusory. Our entire profession is trained to attack 'bright lines'
the way hounds attack foxes." 138 But even apart from where one's
predilections or prejudices lie, certainly some bright-line rules have
more going for them than others. The point may be illustrated by
comparing Robinson with New York v. Belton. 13 9
2. How Bright and How Right?
In Robinson, the Court held that the "general authority" to search
a person incident to arrest is "unqualified." In other words, incident
to a custodial arrest the police may make a full contemporaneous
search of the person of the arrestee, without regard to the likelihood in
the individual case that the search was necessary (Le., to find and secure evidence, to seize weapons and thus prevent escape). This result
is sound, for such a bright-line rule is to be preferred over a case-bycase-determination approach when the police activity at issue involves
relatively minor intrusions into privacy, occurs with great frequency,
and virtually defies on-the-spot rationalization on the basis of the facts
of the individual case. Search of an arrested person is precisely that
kind of police activity: (a) it is the most common variety of police
search practice and occurs under an infinite variety of circumstances;
(b) despite probable cause to arrest, it does not necessarily follow that
tially bright-line rules" ultimately disappear "in a sea of ever-finer distinctions," Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 265 (1983) (White, J., concurring), which themselves may be unsound because the
bright line, by its nature detached from principle, fails "to guide the police and the courts in their
application of the new rule to nonroutine situations." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 471
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 227, 231
(1984).
136. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 15 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
137. 414 U.S. 218 .(1973).
138. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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there is also probable cause the arrestee presently has evidence of that
crime with him or presently is armed, which are much more complex
and difficult determinations; (c) the decision to search an arrestee's
person cannot be made with the degree of forethought and reflection
possible for most other search decisions, as the circumstances arise
from the arrest itself, which is often unanticipated, and the fact of
arrest produces an immediate need to search if the self-protective and
evidence-saving functions are to be realized; and (d) search of the person is a relatively minor intrusion upon a person who, by hypothesis,
has already been subjected to the more serious step of arrest. Moreover, the frisk alternative put forward by the court of appeals would
not suffice to accomplish the self-protection objective during the arrestee's subsequent transportation to the station.
Before any supposed bright-line rule is adopted by the Court, it
would be well to test the proposed rule by asking these questions:
(1) Does it have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact makes
case-by-case evaluation and adjudication unnecessary? (2) Does it
produce results approximating those which would be obtained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying principle were practicable? (3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forgo case-by-case
application of a principle because that approach has proved unworkable? (4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse? The
supposed "workable rule" of Belton, namely, "that when a policeman
bas made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
be may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile," including "the contents of
any containers found within the passenger compartment," 140 flunks on
all counts.
On the first point, the Belton line is none too bright, for it leaves
unresolved such questions as how close to the time of arrest such a
search may be made and whether "interior" includes such places as a
locked glove compartment or the interior of door panels. As for the
second point, Belton accepts "the generalization that articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m],' " 141 while the truth of the matter is that any number of
commonplace events 142 can put the passenger compartment beyond
the arrestee's control. And with respect to the third point, the fact of
140. 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted).
141. 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
142. Including immediate removal of the arrestee to a patrol car or some other place away
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the matter is that applying the Chime! test143 is actually easier in automobile cases than in others, as the police typically can and do remove
the arrestee from the vehicle and thereby ensure that he has no further
control over the passenger compartment. That is, the "difficulty" and
"disarray" alluded to by the Belton majority has been more a product
of the police seeing how much they could get away with than of their
being confronted with inherently ambiguous situations. Finally, and
concerning point four, the new rule is open to manipulation and abuse;
as Justice Stevens correctly noted, now an officer may opt to make a
custodial arrest "whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase or
package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation," as he
thereby gains "the constitutional predicate for broader vehicle
searches than any neutral magistrate could authorize by issuing a warrant." 144 Belton, then, is the consummate example of the "piggyback" bright-line approach gone awry, and proof positive of the adage
that "the chief cause of problems is solutions." 145
It is worth noting at this point that there are some search and
seizure rules which can be said to involve a combination of this
"piggy-back" category and the previously discussed standardized-procedures category. Illustrative is the holding in South Dakota v. Opperman 146 that a vehicle may be inventoried incident to its lawful seizure,
but only "in accordance with standard procedures in the local police
department"; and the ruling in Illinois v. Lafayette 147 that an arrestee's effects may be inventoried at the station, but only pursuant to
"standardized inventory procedures." Though even as so limited the
Opperman and Lafayette holdings are not beyond question, there is no
denying the fact that the mandating of standardized procedures in addition to the "piggy-back" relationship marks a significant limitation
upon the power the police might otherwise exercise. Indeed, it is fair
to say that were the Court in other circumstances to combine the
"piggy-back" and standardized-procedures requirements in other
ways, the results would again be a more meaningful accommodation
of law enforcement and privacy interests. For example, in Robinson
from his own vehicle, handcuffing the arrestee, closure of the vehicle, and restraint of the arrestee
by several officers.
143. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the Court upheld "a search of the
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
144. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. I owe this observation to Eric Sevareid.
146. 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976) (emphasis in original).
147. 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983).
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- or, more precisely in its companion case of Gustafson v. Florida, 148
where the issue was more directly presented - the Court might well
have required that the arrest itself, albeit on probable cause, be in accordance with standardized procedures. That is, the Court might
have required that this "custodial arrest," to which it was attaching an
automatic right to search the person, have been made pursuant to
either legislation or police department regulations which established
some rational scheme for determining when a noncustodial alternative
(i.e., a citation) should and should not be utilized as the means for
invoking the criminal process.149
The Court's failure to do so - the failure to perceive the difference
between Robinson, where the officer was acting pursuant to detailed
police regulations, 150 and Gustafson, where the officer was free to
arrest or ticket as he saw fit - meant that it missed the chance to
make "the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of the fourth
amendment since James Otis argued against the writs of assistance in
1761." 151 This is because absent such a limitation there exists the significant risk that police will arrest for minor offenses merely to avail
themselves of the opportunity to make a valid search despite their lack
of either a warrant or probable cause. Experience has shown that such
pretexts are difficult to uncover, 152 and in any event - as the Supreme
Court now views matters - the unlikely establishment of an illegitimate police motivation would not itself invalidate the incidental
search. 153 That being the case, if the Court had imposed a standardized-procedure requirement onto the custodial arrest itself, the "piggyback" rule of the Robinson case would have been much more palatable, and that of the Belton case would have been at least less
objectionable.
3. Limits of the Category

As with the first two categories of seizures and searches without
probable cause, it may appropriately be asked of this "piggy-back"
category how far the concept may legitimately be pushed without seri148. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
149. See Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints Upon the Power to Make Full Custody
Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 321 (1979).
150. The regulations are set out in United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1097 n.23
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
151. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 416.
152. The pretext is not likely to be acknowledged by the police, and the circumstantial evidence (e.g., in Robinson that the officer apparently knew of the defendant's prior narcotics convictions) is typically inconclusive.
153. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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ously undercutting the fourth amendment's usual probable cause requirement. Worth noting on this point is Michigan v. Summers, 154
where, in contradistinction to such cases as Robinson and Belton, it
was a seizure that was "piggy-backed" onto a search. The police in
that case stopped defendant as he was about to leave premises at
which they had just arrived to execute a narcotics search warrant, detained him within while the warrant was executed, arrested him when
narcotics were found on the premises, and then found heroin in his
pocket. In holding the heroin admissible, the Summers majority ruled
that "a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants
of the premises while a proper search is conducted."155
Although the Court in Summers relied on Terry (rather than
Robinson and Belton) in support of that holding, it is important to
note at the outset that the Court did not merely extend the Terry reasonable suspicion rule to the search warrant context. That is, Summers
is truly a category (3) case, not a category (1) case, for what the
Court's holding does is to "piggy-back" the occupant's detention onto
the search warrant execution, rather than to justify it by the level of
suspicion in the particular case. As the Summers majority emphasized, the rule there promulgated "does not depend upon such an ad
hoc determination, because the officer is not required to evaluate either
the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion
to be imposed by the seizure." 156 To state the proposition another
way, while the Court explains its rule in terms of three significant government interests ("the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found,"
"minimizing the risk of harm to the officers," and "the orderly completion of the search, [which] may be facilitated if the occupants of the
premises are present"), 157 the police need not assess whether detention
is necessary to serve those interests in the particular case. This is because, once again, by the "piggy-back" approach the Court has ruled
that the police may always detain persons found at the premises named
in a search warrant, provided only that (i) the warrant authorizes a
"search for contraband," and (ii) the persons detained are "occupants" (elsewhere referred to by the Court as "residents," and thus
154.
155.
156.
157.
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

692 (1981).
at 705 (footnote omitted).
at 705 n.19.
at 702-03.
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apparently meaning not anyone present158 but rather occupants in the
literal sense159).
If Summers is assayed in the fashion I have previously examined
Robinson and Belton, it comes off rather well. The "piggy-backed"
authority in those cases was a full search of the person and of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle, respectively, while here it is the
temporary detention of a person within his own home. Such a detention, even if longer than that permissible on the street corner under
Terry, still might be characterized as a relatively minimal intrusion,
though it is fair to say that the undefined temporal aspect of the Summers rule 160 is its weakest point. That problem aside, the Summers
rule makes a good deal of sense, for it describes a general category in
which the government interests identified by the Court (especially the
first and most important of the three) are likely to be served. It is not
certain that the contraband named in the warrant will be found, nor is
it certain that its discovery and other relevant facts will in every instance add up to probable cause to arrest the then-present occupant. 161
But the likelihood of these consequences in all cases falling within the
general rule of Summers is sufficiently strong to permit the detention
for some period of time in the interest of "preventing flight in the
event that incriminating evidence is found." 162
Yet the three dissenters 163 in Summers challenge the majority's
analysis every step of the way. In response to the majority's assertion
that Terry and subsequent stop-and-frisk cases establish that "some
seizures" which constitute "limited intrusions" may "be made on less
than probable cause," 164 the Summers dissenters argue that such a departure from the probable cause standard is permissible only in special
circumstances, namely, when there is present "some governmental interest independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and
apprehending suspects, an interest important enough to overcome the
presumptive constitutional restraints on police conduct." 165 They
158. The Court referred to the category as "residents" who ordinarily would in any event
"remain in order to observe the search of their possessions." 452 U.S. at 701.
159. The dictionary definition is one "who occupies," that is, resides as an owner or tenant at
a "particular place or premises." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560
(1971).
160. As the dissenters pointed out, execution of a warrant even in a limited space can take
considerable time. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (FBI search of one·
bedroom apartment for burglary tools and pair of checks consumed five hours).
161. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 42, at§ 3.6(c).
162. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.
163. Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.
164. 452 U.S. at 699.
165. 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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found only "two isolated exceptions" in the Court's prior decisions: in
Terry, the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him."; 166 and in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 167 "the unique governmental interest in preventing the illegal entry of aliens." 16 8
But this simply is not so. Terry and its progeny cannot be explained simply as frisk cases; they are stop-and-frisk cases. As Justice
Harlan wisely pointed out in his concurring opinion in Terry, "if the
frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with
a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on
an encounter, to make aforcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous." 169 Thus,
Terry cannot be distinguished in terms of the "special" interest in selfprotection, 170 for that interest arises only if it is already concluded that
there is a basis to seize a suspect without full probable cause in the
interest (to use the words of the Summers dissent) of "investigating
crime and apprehending suspects." 171 And it has not been seriously
contended that Terry stops may be made only when it is suspected that
the person being investigated is "armed and dangerous." 172
Having said all that, however, it may be suggested that the dissenters' objections would have carried somewhat greater force if they had
not been misled by the majority into viewing Summers as of the Terry
genre. Once again, it is not; Terry permits detention upon reasonable
suspicion, while Summers permits detention when "piggy-backed"
onto execution of a search warrant for contraband. Its consanguinity
is thus with Robinson and Belton, not Terry. Had the Summers dissenters appreciated that fact, they could have made their argument
more convincingly, for the Robinson and Belton cases do rest in large
part on the premise that broadly stated search authority is appropriate
when the risk of error under a case-by-case-evaluation-of-facts approach is a bullet in the gut and not just the loss of evidence. This
suggests that in the Court's future efforts at "factualization" of the
166. 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)).
167. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
168. Summers, 452 U.S. at 706 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
169. 392 U.S. at 32.
170. Indeed, the first government interest relied upon in Terry was "that of effective crime
prevention and detection." 392 U.S. at 22.
171. Any notion that Terry is limited to prevention of as yet uncommitted crimes has been
rejected by the Court. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
172. Even possible limitations where the stop is for a past crime, pondered in Hensley, do not
go this far.
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fourth amendment, the issue which ought to be addressed regarding
the boundaries of category (3) is whether "piggy-backing" (which, after all, makes unnecessary not only traditional probable cause but also
reasonable suspicion) should be permitted only to serve the interest of
self-protection, or whether other interests may also be taken into account, at least when (as in Summers) the police activity onto which the
added fourth amendment power is being "piggy-backed" has the prior
authorization of a magistrate.

IV. WARRANTLESS

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The fourth amendment declares a proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and then states that "no Warrants shall
issue" except upon a certain showing and with certain specificity. As
with constitutional provisions generally, the amendment has "both the
virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity." 173 Among these ambiguities is whether seizures and searches are (sometimes) (always) unreasonable because made without a warrant.
Resort to the warrant process can be beneficial to a fair and effective system of criminal justice in a variety of ways. For one thing, it
permits the critical probable cause determination to be made in relatively calm circumstances by a judicial officer, a person the Supreme
Court has usually perceived as more knowledgeable on these matters
than the cop on the beat. 174 The warrant process, the Court instructs,
"interposes an orderly procedure" 175 involving ''judicial impartiality"176 whereby a "neutral and detached magistrate" 177 can make "informed and deliberate determinations" 178 on the issue of probable
cause. To leave such decisions to the police, says the Court, is to allow
"hurried action" 179 by those "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."1so
Even assuming that this judicial scrutiny is not all that it is cracked
up to be, the process of obtaining a warrant serves an important recording function. By the very fact that the police must commit them173. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42 (1966).
174. But see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983), asserting that warrants are "issued by
persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each
judicial refinement of the nature of 'probable cause.' "
175. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
176. Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51.
177. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
178. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
179. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110.
180. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
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selves in advance to a statement of facts, usually in writing, 181 the
warrant process serves "to facilitate review of probable cause and
avoid justification for a search or an arrest by facts or evidence turned
up in the course of their execution." 182 Absent this pre-search or preseizure memorialization of the facts being relied upon to justify the
fourth amendment activity, there is the risk that the police will engage
in post hoc manipulation of the facts in an effort to justify their action.
Also, even if the police are paragons of virtue, there is nonetheless a
significant chance that the probable cause facts will not be accurately
reported if the occasion for communicating them to a judge comes
only months later in the context of a suppression hearing.1 83
By virtue of the Supreme Court's recent narrowing of the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 184 the warrant process now
serves yet another function: that of substantially reducing the chances
that evidence acquired by a search or a seizure will later be suppressed. This is because Leon holds that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the
prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause." 185 This good faith exception, provided it is confined to withwarrant cases, 186 would thus seem to "give law enforcement officers
some solid encouragement to employ the warrant process for all
searches and arrests which are not made on an emergency basis." 187
The Supreme Court has long expressed a strong preference for
searches made pursuant to a search warrant. 188 Indeed, the Court asserted on one occasion "that the police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures." 189 But this
is far from being an accurate portrayal of current law or practice. 190
181. This is the prevailing practice, though apparently it is not required by the fourth amendment. See United States v. Goyett, 699 F.2d 838 (6th Cir. 1983).
182. Jones v. United States, 5 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2124, 2126 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal,
J., dissenting), revd. on rehearing sub nom. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
183. See, for example, the situation discussed by Ely, J., dissenting in Boyer v. Arizona, 455
F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1972).
184. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
185. 468 U.S. at 900.
186. Some members of the Court are prepared to go further. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
187. P. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 10 (Working Paper,
Sept. 1978).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
189. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
190. See Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference far Search Warrants, 50
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Though there exists some degree of confusion as to just when a warrant is required, 191 it is fair to say that warrantless searches and
seizures are the norm and that resort to the warrant process is the
exception.
This branch of the Supreme Court's "factualization" of the fourth
amendment conveniently divides into two categories. Category (1) has
to do with those instances in which the warrant requirement is impractical, that is, when there exist what the Court likes to call "exigent
circumstances." As we examine that category, we shall see that the
Court's measurement of the exigencies has not been entirely consistent. Also, we shall see another "bright-lines" problem - now,
whether ascertaining when exigent circumstances are present in a certain category of cases is so difficult that the warrant requirement must
be forgone entirely as to those cases.
Category (2), on the other hand, has to do with those instances in
which the protections of the warrant process are deemed unnecessary.
Initially, that might seem to be a contradiction in terms. After all, if
the police activity in question is encompassed within the fourth
amendment's protections, if the warrant process is the preferred manner of proceeding, and if by definition the case is one in which exigent
circumstances are admittedly lacking, then why not require a warrant?
The Supreme Court has never answered this question, and perhaps
there exists no completely satisfactory answer. It may be, however,
that this state of affairs makes some sense in terms of not overloading
the warrant process. A greatly expanded warrant system - that is,
one which truly adhered to the principle that arrest and search warrants are required whenever practicable - might convert that process
into somewhat of a mechanical routine, one in which the judiciary
would "not always take seriously its commitment to make a 'neutral
and detached' decision as to whether there exist grounds for a
search." 192 Simply stated, the proposition being suggested here is this:
as a practical matter, it may well be that the warrant process can serve
TENN. L. REv. 231 (1983); Bloom, Warrant Requirement- The Burger Court Approach, 53 U.

CoLO. L. REV. 691 (1982).
191. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985), takes

note of this confusion and then puts forward as an alternative the following:
[A] warrant is always required for every search and seizure when it is practicable to obtain
one. However, in order that this requirement be workable and not be swallowed by its
exception, the warrant need not be in writing but rather may be phoned or radioed into a
magistrate (where it will be tape recorded and the recording preserved) who will authorize
or forbid the search orally. By making the procedure for obtaining a warrant less difficult
(while only marginally reducing the safeguards it provides), the number of cases where
"emergencies" justify an exception to the warrant requirement should be very small.
Id. at 1471.
192. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 120 (1967).

December 1986]

''Factualization ,, in Search and Seizure

461

as a meaningful device for the protection of fourth amendment rights
only if used selectively to prevent those police practices which would
be most destructive of fourth amendment values. If there is at least
something to that point, then it is useful to examine the Supreme
Court's decisions in this category (2) for the purpose of identifying and
assessing just what it is that the Court takes into account in prioritizing various fourth amendment interests.
A.

Warrant Requirement Impractical

Whatever benefits or advantages are thought to inure from resort
to the warrant process, quite clearly it makes no sense to require a
warrant when the very act of obtaining it would in all likelihood frustrate the purpose of the intended seizure or search. The Supreme
Court has thus long recognized that when such "exigent circumstances" are present, the police may forgo a warrant and instead immediately make a warrantless search or seizure. An especially apt
illustration of this point is Schmerber v. California, 193 where the Court
held that though a search warrant is ordinarily required "where intrusions into the human body are concerned," no warrant was needed to
take a blood sample from an apparently intoxicated driver for the simple reason that the percentage of alcohol in the blood would be significantly diminished if testing were delayed until a warrant could be
obtained. But not all cases are as easy as Schmerber, and as a consequence the Court has sometimes experienced difficulty in gauging the
existence or nonexistence of the requisite "exigent circumstances," and
on other occasions has rightly or wrongly created a "bright-line" rule
to obviate the necessity for police and courts to assay exigencies on a
case-by-case basis.
1. Overstated and Underestimated Exigencies
That the Supreme Court's exigent circumstances assessments are
not all of a kind is perhaps not surprising; indeed, it may well be argued that this is the way it should be, for exigencies cannot be weighed
in the abstract but must be considered in the context of the particular
fourth amendment interests which would be invaded by the intended
arrest or search. One would expect, therefore, as has been the case,
that any claimed exigencies would receive the closest scrutiny when
the challenged police conduct was entry of private premises. Many
years ago the Court acknowledged that a warrantless search of premises might be upheld upon a showing of "exceptional circum193. 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).

462

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:427

stances," 194 but no such circumstances were found to exist in that case
or in others that soon followed. 195 The issue lay dormant for several
years, as in the pre-Chime! days the problem was usually overcome by
the simple expedient of making an arrest on the premises and then
searching the place incident to arrest.
Then came Vale v. Louisiana. 196 Police set up a surveillance of a
house in which Vale was thought to be residing, because they had two
warrants for his arrest issued after his bond had been increased on a
pending narcotics charge. When another person drove up to the house
and sounded his horn, Vale came out, walked to the car and had a
conversation with the driver, looked about cautiously, entered his
house, came back out a few minutes later, looked about again, and
proceeded to the car. Convinced that they had just witnessed a sale of
narcotics, the officers approached. Vale hurried back toward the
house while the driver of the car started away. The driver was apprehended, but not before he swallowed some object. Vale was arrested
on his front steps, after which the police took him inside and made a
cursory inspection of the house to ascertain if anyone else was present.
Minutes later, Vale's mother and brother entered the premises, at
which point the police searched the house and found a quantity of
narcotics in a rear bedroom. The state argued the search was supportable as one made on probable cause and in response to the risk that
someone in the premises might dispose of the narcotics before a warrant could be obtained, but the Supreme Court disagreed:
Such a rationale could not apply to the present case, since by their own
account the arresting officers satisfied themselves that no one else was in
the house when they first entered the premises. But entirely apart from
that point, our past decisions make clear that only in "a few specifically
established and well-delineated" situations, ... may a warrantless search
of a dwelling withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause to conduct it. The burden rests on the State to
show the existence of such an exceptional situation. . . . And the record
before us discloses none.
The officers were able to procure two warrants for Vale's arrest.
They also had information that he was residing at the address where
they found him. There is thus no reason, so far as anything before us
appears, to suppose that it was impracticable for them to obtain a search
warrant as well. 197
194. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
195. E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948).
196. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
197. 399 U.S. at 34-35.
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This is a truly remarkable passage. What is the significance of the
fact "that no one else was in the house when they first entered"? If the
notion is that the risk of destruction of the evidence by Vale's brother
or mother was somehow lessened by the fact the officers beat them
into the premises by a few minutes, then it seems totally indefensible.
If it means that the police, now having discovered the premises were
empty, could have maintained that condition until a warrant was obtained, then surely something more specific about the authority of police to bar persons from their own homes was in order. 198 As for the
contention that the police could have obtained "a search warrant as
well" when they got the two arrest warrants, the facts support precisely the opposite conclusion. A search warrant for narcotics could
not have been obtained on that prior occasion, as the probable cause
had just developed minutes before the search. Precisely because the
Court plays fast and loose with the facts in this way, Vale's contribution to Allen's "process of 'factualization' " is virtually nil. Perhaps
the Court believed, as a lower court put it on a later occasion, 199 that
the risk of destruction of evidence by a family member should not
count as an exigent circumstance because that kind of risk is so prevalent that it would virtually wipe out the warrant requirement for
premises searches. But if that is the point of Vale, it would have been
well for the Court forthrightly to assert it.
As it is, the Court does not clearly state in Vale just what it takes
to amount to exigent circumstances in this context, though it may be
that a limitation was intended to be expressed in the observation that
in the instant case the "goods ultimately seized were not in the process
of destruction." 200 But even this part of Vale can hardly be said to be
a useful "factualization." Lower courts have found it so unrealistically
narrow that they have in the main not accepted it as controlling.
Rather, they have stated the exception in broader terms, such as a
"great likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or removed
before a warrant can be obtained,"201 that the evidence is "threatened
with imminent removal or destruction," 202 or that the police "reasonably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before
they can secure a search warrant."203
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Even today clear guidance is lacking. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.) cen. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).
399 U.S. at 35.
State v. Patterson, 192 Neb. 308, 316, 220 N.W.2d 235, 240 (1974).
United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973).

Michigan Law Review

464

[Vol. 85:427

Vale is as sophistic in one direction as Chambers v. Maroney 204 is
in the other. As a prelude to Chambers, it should be noted that many
years before, in Carroll v. United States, 205 the Court upheld a warrantless search of a vehicle being driven on the highway and reasonably believed to contain contraband, reasoning that it was "not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought."206 That was a fair conclusion on the facts of that case, for the
car's travels could not have been interrupted by the expedient of arresting the occupants; the suspected crime was only a misdemeanor,
and at that time and place a misdemeanor arrest not directly observed
could be made only with a warrant, which the police lacked. But in
Chambers the Court applied the Carroll rule to a situation in which
true exigent circumstances were lacking. The occupants of the vehicle
had already been arrested and were incarcerated, and the search of the
vehicle was undertaken at the station after it was in the custody of the
police and not accessible to anyone but the police. That, however, did
not deter the Court from this astonishing statement: "The probablecause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility
of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure
of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured."207 The failure of Chambers to then address the "unless" portion of that sentence left a mile-wide hole in the Court's analysis, just
as was true of the omission in Vale of any discussion of a police power
to impound the premises. Fortunately, as we shall see shortly, the
Court ultimately dropped the exigent circumstances pretext in Chambers-type cases and now allows warrantless searches of vehicles on another theory.
2. Impossible or Unnecessary?
What the very last observation in the preceding paragraph means
is that of the divaricate bases for forgoing a warrant, the automobile
cases now belong in category (2) rather than category (1). It is well to
note, however, that this transfer has not occurred in other circumstances where most likely it should, so that there persist situations in
which the Supreme Court claims that exigent circumstances are the
reason why warrantless searches are being permitted, when in fact
some other consideration would provide a more convincing explana204.
205.
206.
207.

399
267
267
399

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

42 (1970).
132 (1925).
at 153.
at 52.
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tion for why a warrant is not necessary. Witness the line of cases having to do with inspection of business premises, where again there has
been a tendency to overstate what circumstances are in fact "exigent."
Donovan v. Dewey, 208 upholding a warrantless inspection scheme for
mines, is illustrative. Starting with the congressional finding that
safety hazards in mines can be easily concealed, the Court took this to
mean that "unannounced, even frequent, inspections" were necessary,
which in turn led the Court to the conclusion that therefore a warrant
requirement would "frustrate inspection." 209 Because the execution of
a warrant is ordinarily "unannounced," in the sense that the suspect is
not earlier advised of the application for or issuance of the warrant,
the Court's frustration contention must relate to the need for "frequent" inspections. But if, as the Court earlier noted in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 210 a need for frequent inspections does not mean frequent search warrant applications because most businessmen will cooperate and permit the inspection when the inspector first appears sans
warrant, then it is still not apparent that a warrant requirement, limited to the few cases in which the inspector is turned away, would
"frustrate" the program. This may mean, then, that cases such as
Dewey actually stand for the proposition that in this area the feasibility
of obtaining a warrant has little or nothing to do with whether a
fourth amendment warrant requirement should exist. That may be a
rational conclusion, but if it is, the proposition needs to be expressed
via a process of "factualization" different from that found in these inspection cases to date.
If that is a rational conclusion, presumably it is because the constitutional necessity for a search warrant in this context is best judged by
an inquiry into whether a warrant requirement would be of any significant benefit to businessmen, rather than into whether it would impose
any significant burden on the government. The Dewey decision suggests this approach, for the Court there found it "difficult to see what
additional protection a warrant requirement would provide."211 This
lack of benefit, the Court said in effect, was because the regulatory
scheme itself sufficiently cautioned the inspector and forewarned the
businessman of the frequency and scope of the inspections instead of
"leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked
discretion of Government officers. " 212 Even if this latter conclusion is
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

452
452
436
452
452

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

594 (1981).
at 603.
307 (1978).
at 605.
at 604.
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not free from doubt, the approach of inquiring into the benefits of a
search warrant in a particular business inspection scheme is a promising one. This is especially so if the Supreme Court disentangles the
need-for-warrant and standard-for-inspection issues as to business inspections, which it has not yet done. 213 Once they are separated, making it clear that whatever grounds are needed to inspect must be
present either with or without a warrant, cases like Dewey would be
easy. A warrant is clearly of no benefit where by statute or accepted
practice a superior procedure - a pre-search adversary hearing - is
utilized in lieu of the ex parte application.
3. More on ''Bright Lines"

As noted earlier,214 one of the most troublesome and at the same
time most important issues which exists about how Allen's "process of
'factualization' in the search and seizure cases" should be accomplished has to do with the utility and fairness of using "bright lines" to
define the boundaries of permissible fourth amendment activity. We
have already examined the use of such bright lines to describe deviations from the traditional probable cause test. What remains at this
point is to take note of the bright-lines approach in demarcating excusal of the warrant process.
In United States v. Watson, 215 the Supreme Court held that no
warrant was ever needed to make an arrest in a public place, 216 no
matter how easy it might have been in a particular case for the police
to have armed themselves with an arrest warrant in advance. The
main thrust of the case was that such a conclusion was consistent with
the common law, a point hotly disputed by the Watson dissenters. It
could be said of Watson, then, what one commentator said of a related
Supreme Court decision: 217 "The tedious debate between majority
and dissent on the common law's treatment of [the matter] proved
only that, when source materials are ambiguous, historical inquiries
can produce more confusion than understanding." 218 That makes
even more significant the Court's ultimate attempt to provide a reasoned explanation for the Watson result: a desire not "to encumber
213. In cases like Dewey, where the battle has been fought solely in terms of a claimed search
warrant requirement, the grounds-for-search issue is either ignored or, worse still, alluded to as if
it had absolutely no relevance in a no-warrant context.
214. See text at note 132 supra.
215. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
216. As the Court later made clear, absent exigent circumstances a warrant is needed to
arrest inside private premises. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
217. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
218. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 182 (1980) (footnote omitted).
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criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a
warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like." 219 In
short, a bright-line rule is needed here because of the difficulty in sorting out these arrest cases in terms of actual exigent circumstances.
Whether this is so, whether - as Justice White once put it - it is
not possible to make a reasonable judgment about an intended arrestee's future availability because it is "very difficult to determine the
probability of his flight," 220 is certainly not beyond dispute. At a minimum, it would seem that a different bright line, circumscribing the nowarrant category more narrowly, would be possible. This is because
empirical evidence indicates that while nearly fifty percent of all arrests are made within two hours of the crime as a result of a "hot"
search of the crime scene or a "warm" search of the general vicinity of
the crime, very few additional arrests occur immediately thereafter.
Rather, there is a delay while further investigation is conducted; about
forty-five percent of all arrests occur more than a day after the crime,
and nearly thirty-five percent of all arrests are made after the passage
of over a week. 221 In these latter instances, the risk is negligible that
the defendant would suddenly flee between the time the police solve
the case and the time which would be required to obtain and serve an
arrest warrant. The bright line thus might have been drawn to exclude
these latter cases. That the Court did not do so may reflect its perception that the fourth amendment interests involved in Watson were not
that substantial, a point to which I shall return later. Suffice it to note
here that when the Court in Chime! v. California was considering instead the search of premises incident to arrest, the majority summarily
rejected222 the dissenters' claim that the Court's earlier "bright-line"
rule was necessary because there often is "a strong possibility that confederates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items
for which the police have probable cause to search." 223
Chime! must in turn be distinguished from the question of how to
define the circumstances in which police may forgo the warrant requirement for arrests inside private premises.224 This bit of "factualization" remains to be done by the Supreme Court, though the Court
219. 423 U.S. at 423-24.
220. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 779 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
221. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 96 (1967).
222. 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969).
223. 395 U.S. at 774 (White, J., dissenting).
224. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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has hinted at acceptance of the Dorman v. United States 225 test and
has in one case applied a Dorman factor to achieve a rather questionable result. 226 Dorman is the antithesis of a bright line, for it requires
the weighing and balancing of a list of imprecise factors, an exercise
which experience has shown boggles the minds of police andjudges. 227
The Court would thus be well advised to consider some sort of brightline formula here, perhaps one which distinguishes "planned" arrests228 from those which the police make as a direct result of being
out in the field seeking or investigating criminal conduct.
B.

Warrant Protections Unnecessary

In sharp contrast to the kind of warrant excusal discussed above,
where the operating assumption is that the warrant process is desirable
but unfortunately not feasible given the exigencies, other Supreme
Court decisions permit warrantless fourth amendment activity on the
apparent theory that the protections of the warrant process are simply
unnecessary. As suggested earlier, the best light in which to view
these cases is as grounded in the notion that the warrant process works
best if it is not overloaded but instead preserved for the protection of
those fourth amendment interests most deserving of protection.
Of course, just what those interests are is a matter on which reasonable minds might disagree. In United States v. Chadwick, 229 the
Court finally "fessed up" that its warrantless-search-of-vehicle cases
were not grounded in exigent circumstances, as it had theretofore
claimed, but instead in the "diminished expectation of privacy" in vehicles. But when the government's attorney in the very same case had
the temerity to suggest that this diminished expectation extended to
everything but homes, offices, and private communications, the Court
came down on him like a ton of bricks.230 Apparently the Solicitor
General had bitten off more than the Court was willing to chew, for as
matters have developed there are now a considerable number of fourth
225. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
226. Welsch v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding a warrantless entry to arrest for a
just-completed act of misdemeanor drunk driving was unconstitutional, despite a need to obtain
evidence of defendant's blood alcohol level).
227. See Harbaugh & Faust, ''Knock on Any Door" - Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 DICK. L. REV. 191, 224-25 (1982).
228. As illustrated by the facts of Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chime! v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
229. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
230. The majority deemed it "a mistake," 433 U.S. at 8; Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting, deemed it an "unfortunate" and "extreme view of the Fourth Amendment," 433 U.S. nt
17; Brennan, J., concurring, agreed "wholeheartedly" with that characterization, 433 U.S. nt 16.
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amendment interests which do not receive the protections of the warrant process.
But before we examine just what those interests are, it is necessary
first to take note of another subset of this category (2): those instances
in which no warrant is required simply because, given the theoretical
basis of the contemplated activity and the consequent requisite factual
basis needed to justify it, there would be no meaningful role for the
magistrate to perform. Yet another subset, discussed herein following
the other two because it has some characteristics of both, has to do
with warrantless searches of effects on a "virtual certainty."
1. Magisterial Inutility

Perhaps the clearest case of an instance in which the interposition
of a magistrate would serve no particularly useful purpose is that concerning the inventory of a vehicle in police custody. In South Dakota
v. Opperman, 231 in which the Court upheld warrantless vehicle inventories, Justice Powell touched on this particular point in his
concurrence:
The routine inventory search under consideration in this case does
not fall within any of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. But examination of the interests which are protected when
searches are conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may issue only upon
"probable cause." ... Inventory searches, however, are not conducted in
order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with
established police department rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.232

(Like considerations may determine, in situations where a warrant is
required, what type is necessary. The fact that an arrest warrant is
needed to arrest in one's own premises233 while a search warrant is
needed to take custody of a person then in a third party's premises234
can be explained on the ground that in the latter instance but not the
former the nexus-with-the-premises question calls for judicial
scrutiny.)
Just when it is that going the warrant route would have no utility
is not always apparent, and on occasion has sharply divided the Court.
231.
232.
233.
234.

428 U.S. 364 (1976).
428 U.S. at 382-83 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
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In Camara v. Municipal Court, 235 the Court, as discussed earlier, held
that a housing inspection could be conducted without the traditional
probable cause so long as a particular inspection conformed to "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
inspection."236 The Court also ruled that absent the householder's
consent a warrant was required, though it seems that the magistrate's
role in this setting is a very limited one. He need not weigh facts as
with the usual warrant application, as traditional probable cause is
unnecessary; he is not to evaluate the inspection program itself, as the
majority says judicial review is to occur "without any reassessment of
the basic agency decision to canvass an area"; 237 and he apparently is
not to address the particularities of what to search for and seize, as no
particular type of code violation is suspected at the time of warrant
issuance. This leaves only a determination of whether the particular
inspection fits within the general scheme, which is not all that unlike
deciding whether a particular car inventory conforms to standardized
procedures, a matter the Court later in Opperman appears to have
concluded was not worth a magistrate's time. It is not too surprising,
therefore, that the Camara dissenters saw involvement of the magistrate as a meaningless act: "These boxcar warrants will be identical as
to every dwelling in the area, save the street number itself. I daresay
they will be printed up in pads of a thousand or more - with space for
the street number to be inserted - and issued by magistrates in broadcast fashion as a matter of course. " 23 8
This is not to suggest, however, that Camara cannot be squared
with the later Opperman decision. Having a judicial determination of
whether the particular contemplated vehicle inventory fits within an
established plan or procedure may be less necessary because (a) the
privacy interest in vehicles falls below that in houses; and (b) the inventory risk is not to all vehicles (as inspection is to all residences), but
only to those already in police custody. But the most likely basis of
distinction is that the warrant itself serves a function in Camara that is
unnecessary in an Opperman type of case. As the Camara majority
stressed, requiring that the inspector have a warrant reassures the
householder that "the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. " 239 The dispossessed owner of a car needs no like assurance
as to the inventory of his vehicle when it is already in police custody.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

387
387
387
387
387

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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523 (1967).
at 538.
at 532.
at 554 (Clark, J., dissenting).
at 532.
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That this reassurance aspect of the warrant process is an important, perhaps dominant, consideration in Camara is suggested by subsequent events. In Donovan v. Dewey, 240 authorizing warrantless
inspection of mines, the court reasoned, in effect, that the operator of a
pervasively regulated business needed no comparable assurance because the regulatory scheme itself forewarned the businessman of the
frequency and scope of the inspections. And in Michigan v. Clifford, 241 where a majority of the Court rejected the Court's earlier
view242 that an inspection warrant was required for a with-notice postfire inspection into the cause of a fire, the conclusion as to the inutility
of magisterial participation was grounded in the fact that such inspections are triggered only by an uncontrovertible prior event: a fire of
unknown origin. The householder therefore has no reason to doubt
the inspector's authority or to fear he has been arbitrarily selected as
the focus of official scrutiny.
2.

Lesser Fourth Amendment Interests

In considering the possible justification of warrantless seizures on
the ground that the fourth amendment interests involved are "secondtier" and thus not in need of the added protections of the warrant
process, it is useful to begin with United States v. Watson. 243 Watson,
upholding warrantless arrests made in public places, is woefully short
on analysis, except for the previously discussed asserted need for a
bright-line rule because of undetectable exigencies. 244 But the case
may be grounded in part in an unstated assumption that taking physical custody of a person is not a "major" fourth amendment intrusion
and thus is not in need of advance judicial scrutiny. Such a view of
Watson helps square it with Gerstein v. Pugh, 245 which requires a judicial probable cause determination as a prerequisite "to extended restraint of liberty following arrest" because the "consequences of
prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest."
If this is in fact an undercurrent in Watson, it might be thought to
reflect a rather distorted set of fourth amendment priorities. As Professor Barrett pointed out some years ago, a "police decision to arrest
an individual and initiate the process of criminal prosecution is in it240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

452 U.S. 594 (1981).
464 U.S. 287 (1984).
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
See text at note 219 supra.
420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
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self a significant invasion of personal liberty even though the individual's innocence is ultimately established":246 there is the indignity of
arrest, the process of booking and fingerprinting, etc., the acquiring of
an arrest record, and the subsequent detention until released on bail or
via Gerstein. By contrast, when only a search is involved, "in terms of
practical consequences the damage suffered is primarily to property
interests and is not significantly different from the damage resulting
from illegal entries by burglars or other criminals."247 For this reason,
so his argument proceeds, one would expect "that the Fourth Amendment would be applied today in a manner which would give primary
protection against illegal arrests and similar deprivations of personal
liberty. " 248
Whether Barrett has his priorities straight is not entirely clear. If I
were given a multiple-choice test in which my options were either to
be arrested and tossed in jail or to have my manse subjected to a full
search, and there was not also a "none of the above" option, I'm not
quite sure what my choice would be. But even accepting that Barrett's
assessment of the respective intrusions of arrest and search is correct,
it does not inevitably follow that the Watson rule is wrong. Given the
fact that this enterprise of identifying certain lesser fourth amendment
interests can be justified, if at all, on a desire to keep warrant review
meaningful by not overburdening the process, there is another ingredient which belongs in the equation at this point. It is, interestingly
enough, an ingredient which Barrett himself later supplied: that the
volume of arrests is so high that if a warrant were required for each
one except when genuine exigent circumstances were present, the
courts could not "cope with the added burden."249 In other words, in
determining whether a warrant should ordinarily be required for a
particular variety of fourth amendment activity, it is necessary to consider not only the magnitude of the fourth amendment interests involved but also the magnitude of the burden which a warrant
requirement would place upon the judiciary. This may explain why,
notwithstanding Watson, the Supreme Court on two occasions went
out of its way to encourage the practice of taking persons to the station
on reasonable suspicion for purposes of fingerprinting or possibly
other identification - but then emphasized that a warrant would be
246. Barrett, Persona/ Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. Cr.
46.
247. Id. at 47.
248. Id.
249. Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem ofMass Production, in THE COURTS, THE PUB·
LIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 118 (1965).
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required for this even less intrusive but certainly less frequent
practice. 2 5°
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court finally abandoned the fiction
of exigent circumstances as the justification for warrantless searches of
vehicles, even those in police custody, and now explains the warrant
excusal primarily on a lesser fourth amendment interests theory. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is United States v. Chadwick, 251 for
the Court there found it necessary to specify exactly what it was that
produced "the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the
automobile" and then to determine whether those characteristics were
likewise attributable to the footlocker subjected to warrantless search
in that case. As for a vehicle's second-class status, the Court stressed
these facts: (i) "its function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects"; (ii) it "travels
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view"; (iii) there exist "extensive and detailed codes regulating
the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be operated on
public streets and highways"; and (iv) cars "periodically undergo official inspection, and they are often taken into police custody in the
interest of public safety."252 A warrant was required for the footlocker, the court next concluded, for none of those four characteristics
was applicable to it; rather, luggage is "not open to public view," is
"not ... subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis," and "is intended as a repository of personal e:tfects."253
The distinction may have seemed not totally implausible in Chadwick, where the luggage was a 200-pound footlocker secured by both a
padlock and a regular trunk lock. But it began to dissolve when the
Court thereafter decided Arkansas v. Sanders, 254 holding a warrant
was required for search of the luggage in that case as well. For one
thing, unlike Chadwick, where it could be said the luggage had a tenuous connection with the vehicle because it had been placed into the
open trunk just moments before its seizure, Sanders involved a suitcase
earlier placed in the trunk of a cab which was later stopped by the
police. For another, and more important, the suitcase was unlocked,
and thus there was no basis for asserting (as one might have as to the
situation in Chadwick) that a higher privacy expectation could be attributed to the rather extraordinary security measures taken. If, as
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Hayes v.
433 U.S.
433 U.S.
433 U.S.
442 U.S.

Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
1 (1977).
at 12-13.
at 13.
753 (1979).
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Sanders held, that suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle was entitled to
the protections of the warrant process, then it was difficult to see why
the result should be any different had the contents of that suitcase (but
not the case) been in that trunk. This is because, to put the matter in
terms of the four points made in Chadwick, (i) people do use the
trunks of cars as "the repository of personal effects"; (ii) what is in the
trunk is not "in plain view"; (iii) limits on how cars may be operated
have little to do with what is in the trunk of a car; and (iv) "official
inspection" does not, at least without advance notice, result in scrutiny
of places in cars where personal effects might be stored.
What Chadwick and Sanders did have in common was that in both
instances there was probable cause to search the container only and
not the vehicle at large, and that turned out to be the point of limitation on the warrant-for-luggage-in-cars requirement. Such was the
holding in United States v. Ross, 255 about which it will suffice to say
that the curious distinction drawn there is probably about the best that
could be done if the Court was unwilling to turn away from either
Chadwick-Sanders on the one hand or Chambers v. Maroney 256 and its
progeny on the other. But there is a moral to all this: when the explanation for characterizing something as a lesser fourth amendment interest is no more convincing than it was in Chadwick, trouble further
down the path of fourth amendment "factualization" is to be expected.
Further reflection upon the Supreme Court's decisions concerning
the warrant requirement as it relates to effects reveals another distinction, one which has considerably more going for it than that drawn in
Chadwick The general point is that the protection of privacy interests
is deemed more important than the protection of possessory interests,
so that a warrant is generally required as to the former but not the
latter. Illustrative of this point is Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 257 where
the Court elaborated the "plain view" doctrine. The essence of the
Court's explanation was that if in the course of the lawful execution of
a search warrant the police find an item not named in that warrant
(and not improperly omitted therefrom), 258 they may seize it on probable cause without first obtaining a magistrate's authorization. This is
because, the Court explained, "the magistrate's scrutiny is intended to
eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause,"25 9 not a
255. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
256. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
257. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
258. This is the most rational interpretation of the Coolidge requirement that the discovery
have been "inadvertent."
259. 403 U.S. at 467.
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problem on such facts because the search had already been authorized
and conducted. This left only the pending act of dispossession, that is,
the seizure from the defendant's custody or control, which presented
only a "minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections"260 and thus
could proceed without a warrant.
Much the same reasoning was involved in the "controlled delivery" case of Illinois v. Andreas, 261 holding that where the contents of a
package were lawfully examined by the authorities as it passed
through customs and a delivery of that package was arranged by police, promptly after which the recipient was arrested and the package
taken from him and opened, no warrant was needed. There was a
seizure, but given the prior lawful viewing "the subsequent reopening
... is not a 'search.' " 262 If the situation is the reverse of that in Coolidge and Andreas, that is, if the police make a privacy intrusion but
not a possessory one, then chances are a warrant is required. Such is
the teaching of Walter v. United States, 263 holding that if a private
party to whom a package was misdelivered turns it over to the police,
the police still need a warrant to scrutinize more closely264 the contents of that package. This is because, the Court explained in Walter,
under the Sanders rule265 "an officer's authority to possess a package is
distinct from his authority to examine its contents.''2 66
3.

"Virtual Certainty" of Contents

The third subset of this category (2) - concerning, again, when
the warrant process is deemed unnecessary - combines characteristics of the preceding two. For one thing, the fourth amendment interests involved are of a lesser variety, though the situations fall slightly
short of the Coolidge plain view. For another, though it cannot be said
that there would be no role for the magistrate to perform in the Opperman sense, the circumstances are such that error seems unlikely even
absent antecedent judicial scrutiny. The starting point here is nownotorious footnote 13 of the Sanders case:
260. 403 U.S. at 467.
261. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
262. 463 U.S. at 772.
263. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
264. In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), the Court held it was no search for
the police to open the container to the extent it had previously been opened by the private person
turning the container over to them.
265. The Court there, though holding the suitcase in the vehicle could not be searched without a warrant, indicated a warrantless seizure of it while a warrant was sought would be permissible. 442 U.S. at 761-62.
266. 447 U.S. at 654.
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Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of
a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case)
by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to
"plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant. 2 67

Putting aside the truly plain view situation in which the officer's
senses directly perceive the contents (including where the container is
partly open or transparent), 268 what is footnote 13 intended to cover?
Certainly it makes sense to include here plain view once-removed, as
where, to use the language of the plurality in Robbins v. California, 269
"the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents."
This covers the "gun case" paradigm in Sanders but not the "kit of
burglar tools" illustration, for the latter has no "distinctive configuration." The "factualization" in footnote 13 thus includes an inherent
ambiguity: was the burglar tools hypothetical merely an ill-considered
example, or was it intended to suggest there are still other situations in
which no warrant is required?
The Robbins case illustrates the significance of this question, for
each of the packages searched in that case resembled "an oversized,
extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded corners and edges,"
"wrapped or boxed in an opaque material covered by an outer wrapping of transparent, cellophane-type plastic," and "sealed on the
outside with at least one strip of opaque tape." 270 The state court declared these packages had the appearance of wrapped bricks of marijuana and thus fell within footnote 13, but the Robbins plurality in
concluding to the contrary asserted that to come within footnote 13 "a
container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer."271 Given the result in Robbins, the "or otherwise" part of the language just quoted seems to mean at least this:
even if the contents of the container are not in plain view or plain view
once-removed (i.e., because of a "distinctive configuration"), the protections of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment still do not
come into play when there is (i) a high degree of certainty about the
267. 442 U.S. at 764 n.13.
268. See, e.g., Tillman v. State, 275 Ark. 275, 630 S.W.2d 5 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1201 (1983) (garment bag partially open); Commonwealth v. lnvin, 391 Mass. 765, 463 N.E.2d
1178 (1984) (marijuana visible through container).
269. 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981).
270. 453 U.S. at 422 n.l.
271. 453 U.S. at 428.
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contents of the container, and (ii) this certainty is ascertained from the
nature of the container itself.
The first of these possible requirements leads to Texas v. Brown, 272
where after a lawful stopping of a car an officer saw the driver drop a
knotted opaque party balloon onto the seat and then observed several
small plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder and an open pack
of party balloons in the glove compartment. As to defendant's objection to the warrantless seizure of the balloon, the Brown plurality upheld it as based on probable cause, which at first blush looks as if
footnote 13 of Sanders had hypertrophied to the point of consuming
the Sanders holding. But this is not so. The defendant in Brown inexplicably challenged only the warrantless seizure of the balloon, and
thus the case fits comfortably with those discussed earlier concerning
warrantless seizure of effects. Of significance here, however, is the
statement of three Justices in Brown that what would justify a warrantless search of a container, absent either exigent circumstances or
probable cause to search the car in which the container is found, is "a
degree of certainty that is equivalent to the plain view of the heroin
itself," that is, a "virtual certainty that the balloon contained a controlled substance. "273
Whether upon further "factualization" of the fourth amendment
this "virtual certainty" test will evolve as the standard under footnote
13 remains to be seen. (Shortly after Brown, the Court in a somewhat
analogous situation utilized a less demanding - and, it would seem,
more ambiguous - test.)274 At least on a theoretical level, this "virtual certainty" approach has something going for it; given the other
situations now well established as falling into category (2), it certainly
may be argued that the warrant process is just as unnecessary when
the fourth amendment interests are low and the certainty about the
container's contents is high. Whether it would work well in practice is
272. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
273. 460 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring). As they
observed:
Sometimes there can be greater certainty about the identity of a substance within a
container than about the identity of a substance that is actually visible. One might actually
see a white powder without realizing that it is heroin, but be virtually certain a balloon
contains such a substance in a particular context. It seems to me that in evaluating whether
a person's privacy interests are infringed, "virtual certainty" is a more meaningful indicator
than visibility.
460 U.S. at 751 n.5.
274. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983), where the question was whether a container,
previously lawfully opened and then the subject of a controlled delivery, could be reopened without a warrant when there had been a short break in the police surveillance. The court answered
in the affirmative, holding "that absent a substantial likelihood that the contents have been
changed, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a container previously
opened under lawful authority." 463 U.S. at 773.
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another matter, which naturally raises for consideration the second
possible requirement enumerated earlier: that this virtual certainty
must arise from (to use the words of footnote 13) the "very nature" of
the container. Although this might seem to be one way to keep the
"virtual certainty" category within meaningful bounds, such a limitation would appear to be the likely source of a great deal of mischief.
The fact of the matter, as both Robbins 215 and Brown 276 convincingly
illustrate, is that it is not easy to separate out the nature of the
container from the circumstances of its possession or transportation.
Does this mean that a "virtual certainty" category should be limited not at all by the source of the information so that, for example, it
could exist when the container is totally innocuous but the police
gained information about its contents from an informant with extraordinary credentials? Probably not. For one thing, such an openended warrant exception, not limited to first-hand perception of the
police concerning the container and the circumstances of its use,
would increase the risk of erroneous police decisions on the "virtual
certainty" question. For another, it would outrun the rationale of footnote 13, which is that a person can lose any reasonable expectation of
privacy in a container by the way in which he uses it.
What then of incriminating admissions by the defendant as to the
contents of a container? This should suffice, Justice Rehnquist concluded in Robbins, for the defendant "could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the garbage bags" in light of his
admissions to the police that they contained marijuana. 277 This is an
attractive conclusion, for the act of stating to police the contents of the
container is much like revealing the contents by using a transparent
container.278 An unequivocal incriminating admission regarding the
contents of the container leaves virtually no doubt as to what those
contents are; by contrast, whether the officer's expertise and experience permit the conclusion that certain types of containers are very
275. If one were to ask in that case whether there was a "virtual certainty" that the packages
contained marijuana, certainly one would consider not only that they were found in the luggage
compartment after the officers had already discovered marijuana in the passenger compartment,
but also defendant's statement that "[w]hat you are looking for is in the back." 453 U.S. at 442
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
276. If one were to ask in that case whether there was a "virtual certainty," one would
consider not only the knotted balloon but also the fact that it had been seen within a car in which
there were also observed several small plastic vials and quantities of loose white powder.
277. 453 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
278. The analogy is most compelling when the statement is as to the entire contents of the
container. If a person tells the police he has a stolen diamond ring in his suitcase, it might be
argued that this is not a surrender of his privacy expectation regarding the contents of the case
generally.
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likely used only to hold illegal drugs arguably is precisely the kind of
question as to which the judgment of a neutral and detached magistrate would be beneficial.
V.

DENOUEMENT

Back in 1950, Frank Allen - having noted that the Supreme
Court, by distinguishing various forms of speech activity, had brought
a degree of rationality to first amendment jurisprudence decidedly
lacking in the Court's fourth amendment decisions - suggested the
need for a "process of 'factualization' in the search and seizure
cases. " 279 In the intervening years, the Court has pursued that process
in a multitude of cases, generally with favorable results. Recognition
that "probable cause" should be variegated has contributed substantially to a more meaningful balancing of privacy and law-enforcement
interests. Likewise, appreciation that a warrant-unless-absolutely-impossible approach is unsound and that in fact warrants are impracticable or unnecessary in diverse circumstances has also had a salubrious
effect upon fourth amendment jurisprudence.
This is not to say that I agree with the result in each of the cases
discussed herein, for I do not. Nor is this to suggest that I subscribe to
the Court's "factualization" reasoning in each instance, for I do not.
But merely because I and others might not concur in all of the
Supreme Court's efforts in this direction hardly suggests that the "factualization" undertaking has not been worthwhile. Rather, it is
merely a natural manifestation of the difficulty of the enterprise. A
"monolith"280 style fourth amendment, away from which we have
moved over a course of years, is hardly desirable, but then "a fourth
amendment with all of the character and consistency of a Rorschach
blot"281 is no less pernicious. Steering between such Scylla and Charybdis is no mean task. It requires, inter alia, careful assessment of the
respective merits of bright-line and ad hoc style "factualization"; comparative evaluation of the reasonable suspicion, standardized-procedures, and "piggy-back" modes of departure from traditional probable
cause; and thoughtful calculation of just what makes the warrant process feasible and efficacious.
Allen expressed the hope in 1950 that by a process of factualization there would result, among other things, a relaxing of tensions.
The extent to which this has occurred may be open to dispute; I am
279. Allen, supra note 10, at 4.
280. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 388.
281. Id. at 375.
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sure some would point to the fact that most of the cases discussed
earlier evoked rather sharp divisions on the Court. But this again may
reflect nothing more than the inherent difficulty of the "factualization"
process. Certainly the tensions are not what they would have been if,
for example, full-fledged arrests and street-corner encounters were still
subjected to precisely the same fourth amendment limitations.
Allen also saw the process of "factualization" as a way to move
fourth amendment law out of its then "state of unstable equilibrium. "282 Here, too, I am sure not all observers of the fourth amendment scene would reach the same conclusion about the extent to
which this desirable end has been achieved. Certainly not all of the
Court's cases can be reconciled, and there remain significant doubts as
to just how the Court would or should come out on a variety of unresolved fourth amendment issues. But certainly there has been nothing in recent years (not even the Court's difficulties with the cars
versus containers distinction) which even approaches the Marron to
Go-Bart to Harris to Trupiano to Rabinowitz vacillation2 sJ which
prompted Allen's comment. A significant degree of stability has been
achieved. Moreover, as the Court takes on more fourth amendment
cases and continues with the process of "factualization," so that it may
to an even greater degree "see in the round rather than the flat, and
... gain some understanding of the whole in action," 284 there is every
reason to hope that greater stabilization and reduction of tensions will
occur.
As Frank Allen has put it: "There is ground for optimism. It is
high time. " 285
282.
283.
284.
285.

Allen, supra note 10, at 4.
See text at notes 65-72 supra.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 263 (1960).
Allen, supra note 13, at 542.

